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Abstract 
 This thesis studies how managerial incentives relate to strategic transmission of 
soft information from managers to investors in order to attract attention of financial 
markets. Additionally, I study trading reaction of different investors (large sophisticated 
vs. small individual) to CEO voluntary announcements and how their trading is affected 
when managerial incentives are taken into account. I use large panel data and several 
alternative proxies for soft information together with intraday trading data to distinguish 
between the types of investors. The findings suggest that an increase in the proportion 
of managerial variable compensation is correlated with the increased use of attention 
attracting mechanisms like stock split announcements, CEO annual EPS forecasts and 
firm media coverage. Remarkably, such an increase in attention is not for free given that 
the probability of CEO turnover increases if managers fail to obtain positive stock 
returns. Further, I examine investors' trading reaction to managerial voluntary 
disclosures (EPS forecasts) and find that small investors follow simple trading strategy 
and buy on positive CEO announcements, whereas large investors react in a contrarian 
way. In addition, I find that both types of investors take into account managerial 
incentives while trading, though in opposite ways. Small investors see managerial 
variable compensation as an incentive to lure them into more buying to optimistic 
announcements. Large investors, on the other hand, look at managerial pay-for-
performance incentives as a mechanism of aligning managers' and shareholders' 
interests.                                                                                                        
 
 1 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 Managers have superior information about their firms and disclosing this 
information will possibly have an effect on firms' market value. CEOs make voluntary 
disclosures in order to align investors' expectations about the firm with their own 
(Ajinkya and Gift, 1984), alleviate information asymmetry between shareholders and 
managers (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991), reduce the cost of capital for the firm 
(Botosan, 1997) and increase analyst following and thus attract attention in order to 
correct stock valuation problems (Healy et al., 1999; Almazan et al., 2008). The 
objective of this thesis is to study what are the mechanisms that incentivize CEOs to 
credibly transmit soft unverifiable information to the market. A typical managerial 
contract provides both explicit and implicit incentives for managers to care about stocks' 
market value. Explicit incentives are provided through stock-related compensation 
packages, whereas implicit incentives include the threat of dismissal that may follow 
bad stock market performance (Coates and Kraakman, 2006; Jenter and Kanaan, 2006; 
Kaplan and Minton, 2012).  
 Managers enjoy large discretion over the disclosure of soft information and they 
can use it in a strategic way in order to pursue their own interests (Aboody and Kasznik, 
2000; Rogers and Stocken, 2005). The risk of playing the market is high as soft 
information cannot be easily verified, unlike hard information (e.g. sales volume, book 
values of different assets etc.). This raises the issue of its credibility when disclosed. 
One way to obtain credibility is through the use of costly signals about firm value such 
as leverage and dividends (Spence, 1973; Brealey, Leland and Pyle, 1977; Ross, 1977).  
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In this thesis, however, I concentrate on “cheap talk” signals i.e. the measures that 
attract analysts' and investors’ attention without any apparent costs for the firm. A 
credible way to communicate soft information to the market involves the following 
conditions: managers should have incentives to disclose soft information truthfully to 
investors and attracting attention must be costly for CEOs (Bhattacharya and Dittmar, 
2008; Almazan et al., 2008). The first part of this thesis is dedicated to an empirical 
study of how managerial incentives determine the strategic transmission of soft 
information from managers to investors through the use of “cheap talk” that attracts 
attention and the effect such transmission may have on managerial survival and 
compensation. The sample used consists of a large panel data of 3,333 US firms for the 
1992-2011 period. The three different proxies of “cheap talk” to be used are: stock split 
announcements, CEO annual voluntary EPS forecasts and firm media coverage. The 
results found indicate that, first, an increase in the proportion of CEOs' variable 
compensation that is directly linked to stock market prices, induces managers to use 
“cheap talk” strategies. In particular, it turns out that an increase in the proportion of 
stock and stock option awards in CEOs' remuneration packages is correlated with an 
increase in (i) the probability of stock splits, (ii) the frequency of CEO EPS forecasts 
and (iii) the level of firm media coverage. Second, the use of these measures serves to 
attract attention as they are associated with an increase in the analysts’ attention, both in 
terms of number of analysts issuing EPS reports and revising the estimates upwards. 
Finally, the evidence is consistent with the idea that “cheap talk” works as a credible 
signal because it is costly for the CEOs i.e. they are punished for an improper use of it. 
In particular, the results indicate that a decrease in returns following cheap talk is 
correlated with an increase in the probability of CEO turnover and/or a decrease in 
his/her total compensation in the subsequent year.  
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 The degree to which voluntary managerial announcements successfully and 
credibly align the expectations of investors with their own depends, on the one hand, on 
executives' ex ante motivation to disclose truthful information and, on the other hand, 
on the  investors ability to understand and verify the supplied information and scrutinize 
incentives of the manager. Now that the connection between CEO incentives and cheap 
talk has been set up in the first part of the thesis, I want to study the trading reaction of 
investors to managerial voluntary announcements (EPS forecasts) depending on their 
level of sophistication (i.e. knowledge, skills and means to analyze supplied 
information). In the second part of the thesis, I particularly want to check if different 
types of investors take into account CEO incentives for disclosures and in what 
direction do managerial incentives affect their trading strategies.  
 I use a sample of 1085 CEO voluntary earnings announcements for the period 
2002-2010 and, by employing an intraday trading information from NYSE TAQ (trades 
and quotes) database, study the net buying behavior of large and small investors on the 
informational content of the announcements (forecast errors) and investors’ evaluation 
of managerial incentives as a factor in the truthful disclosures. First, I find that small 
investors are the ones driving up prices after positive earnings surprises, while large 
investors play a contrarian strategy, they sell when the CEOs are too optimistic. Second, 
both small and large investors understand the influence of managerial incentives on 
voluntary announcements but react in opposite directions depending on the credibility 
they lend to the announcing CEOs. Small investors consider the information from the 
managers with higher pay-for-performance sensitive compensation packages as 
untruthful and thus they sell, large investors look at the incentives as the means of 
aligning managers' and shareholders' interests and consider the announcements more 
credible, so they buy. Finally, I also find that, anticipating this different behavior of 
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large and small investors, CEOs take into account the investor base of the firm when 
designing their disclosure policy. Voluntary earnings announcements are more likely 
and more optimistic in companies with a larger proportion of small investors.  
Lastly, since the first part of the thesis employs stock split announcements as 
one of the measures of cheap talk, I find it interesting to investigate more deeply the 
informational value of the event in part three. Previous research has identified two 
widely accepted reasons behind stock splits: i) the trading range hypothesis: returning 
previously elevated stock prices to the optimal trading range and thus enhance liquidity 
and ii) the signaling hypothesis: splits convey favorable information about the future 
performance of companies (prices and earnings will keep going up further) to investors. 
Both hypotheses have been tested with numerous alternative measures and mixed 
results have been found up to date.  
 My goal is to contribute to the signaling role of stock splits and overtake an 
empirical exercise to see what type of investors trade around stock split announcements. 
My expectation is that if stock splits serve as signals of future performance of the firm 
than large investors should take advantage of the information and trade on it. 
 I use intraday trading data from NYSE TAQ (trades and quotes) database to 
construct net abnormal buying of different investor categories based on their trade sizes 
as a proxy for their level of sophistication. The empirical tests show that solely small 
investors exert positive and significant net buying behavior on stock split 
announcements. However, I have found that large investors are buying abnormally more 
when splits are exceptionally large (more than two-for-one splits). Thus, although stock 
splits per se do not seem to serve as signals, the size of the split does. 
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 Further, I find that the probability of splits increases with higher proportion of 
trades initiated from large investors and vise versa for small traders. I conclude that 
managers want to change firm investor base by attracting smaller investors through 
lower prices achieved after stock splits. Lastly, CEOs also take into account firm 
investor base when they are deciding on the size of the splits. I find that the proportion 
of large (small) investors is positively (negatively) correlated with the size of stock 
splits. 
 The rest of the thesis is structured in the following way. Chapter 2 presents the 
study of CEO incentives for attracting attention. Chapter 3 studies the reaction of 
different investors to CEO voluntary announcements. Chapter 4 proposes an empirical 
test of informational value of stock splits to different types of investors and Chapter 5 
provides final remarks.  
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CHAPTER 21 
 
Managerial Incentives for Attracting Attention 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The corporate finance literature, starting with Modigliani and Miller, studies how 
managerial decisions can increase firm value. However, separation of ownership and 
control gives rise to an agency problem between shareholders and managers: the 
shareholders want the manager to maximize share value, but the manager wants to 
maximize his own utility. This problem can be partially solved by making the 
manager’s utility depend on the stock market value. A typical managerial contract 
provides both explicit and implicit incentives for managers to care about stocks' market 
value. Explicit incentives are provided through stock-related compensation packages, 
whereas implicit incentives include both the threat of dismissal and the reputational loss 
that may follow bad stock market performance (Coates and Kraakman, 2006; Jenter and 
Kanaan, 2006; Kaplan and Minton, 2012).  
Interestingly, these incentives will alter managers' disclosure policy because the 
information transmitted to investors will affect stock prices and, in turn, this will have 
consequences for managerial remuneration and reputation (Almazan et al., 2008). In 
particular managers will have to make decisions about two different types of 
information that is generated inside the firm and must be communicated to the outside 
investors: hard and soft information. On the one hand, there are pieces of information 
                                                            
1 This chapter is written together with Josep A. Tribó and María Gutiérrez. 
 
. 
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about the company that can be codified in a systematic way and that can be verified by 
the receivers of this information: this is the, so-called hard information, such as sales 
volume or board appointments. On the other hand, there is soft information related to 
intangibles like CEO’s ability, firm’s strategy, employee morale, which cannot be 
verified. This soft information is even more important than the hard one for investors to 
monitor (Cornelli and Ljungqvist, 2013). Remarkably, managers enjoy large discretion 
over the disclosure of soft information and they can use it in a strategic way in order to 
pursue their own interests. Because of this, the issue of the credibility of such 
information is particularly important. 
Credibility can either be obtained through the use of costly signals about firm value, 
such as leverage and dividends. However, in order for “cheap talk” - or doing anything 
that will attract analysts' and investors’ attention - to work as a credible way to 
communicate soft information to the market, two conditions must hold. First, managers 
should have incentives to disclose soft information truthfully to investors. The manager 
should only raise flags when he thinks that the firm is undervalued. Second, attracting 
attention must be costly for CEOs. After attracting attention, investors revise and 
upgrade their expectations about the firm. In case they do not find the firm to be 
undervalued, and thus there is no increase in the market value of the firm, then the CEO 
will be punished with lower compensation or removal from the firm (Bhattacharya and 
Dittmar, 2008; Almazan et al., 2008).  
In this paper we study empirically how managerial incentives determine the 
strategic transmission of soft information from managers to investors through the use of 
“cheap talk” that attract attention and the effect that such transmission may have on 
managerial survival and compensation. We use a sample of 3,333 US firms for the 
1992-2011 period, and analyze three different measures of “cheap talk”: stock split 
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announcements, CEO annual voluntary EPS forecasts and firm media coverage. First, 
we show that an increase in the proportion of CEOs' variable compensation, which is 
directly linked to stock market prices, induces managers to use “cheap talk” strategies. 
In particular, it turns out that an increase in the proportion of stocks and stock option 
awards in CEOs' remuneration packages is correlated with an increase in (i) the 
probability of stock splits, (ii) the frequency of CEO EPS forecasts and (iii) the level of 
firm media coverage. Second, our results also show that the use of these measures 
serves to attract attention as we find that they are associated with an increase in the 
analysts’ attention, both in terms of number of analysts issuing EPS reports and revising 
the estimates upwards. Finally, we find evidence consistent with the idea that “cheap 
talk” works as a credible signal because it is costly for the CEOs i.e. they are punished 
for an improper use of cheap talk. In particular, we observe that a decrease in returns 
following cheap talk is correlated with an increase in the probability of CEO turnover 
and/or a decrease in his/her total compensation in the subsequent year.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 covers the related 
theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3 discusses data and methodological issues. 
Section 4 presents the main results and Section 5 is devoted to the robustness checks. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.2. Related Literature and Contribution 
 
The disclosure policy of a firm will determine how much and how fast 
information about the firm reaches the market. A firm will be considered more 
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transparent (opaque) when it delivers more (less) information or more (less) frequent 
information to the market.  
Managers can credibly transmit positive soft information to the market by using 
signals. In an asymmetric information world where the amount of bad projects exceeds 
the amount of good ones, the role for signaling is critical for an efficient functioning of 
the stock markets. The topic of costly signaling has been addressed extensively in the 
past, starting with the seminal contributions of Spence (1973), Brealey, Leland and Pyle 
(1977) and  Ross (1977).  
The signaling literature is based on the idea that signals are credible because 
they are costly. However some recent theory papers have also discussed the potential 
credibility and informational content of apparently costless announcements (“cheap 
talk”). Bhattacharya and Dittmar (2008) build a theoretical model where costless 
announcements convey valuable information to the market. The intuition behind this 
result is that good firms can attract attention of analysts and speculators by making 
apparently costless announcements and bad firms will not mimic them for the fear of 
being discovered and suffer from the consequent price drop. Therefore, what may seem 
like costless announcements are not costless after all. Their cost comes from the danger 
of attracting attention of informed parties that can update their valuation of the firm 
positively or negatively. These authors state the conditions under which firms choose 
between costly vs. costless signals. They claim that only the more undervalued and 
more ignored firms will use "costless signals" given that these are the only firms that 
speculators will find attractive enough to investigate, given the higher benefits that can 
be obtained from discovering new information about them. On the contrary, those other 
firms that are less undervalued and less ignored by speculators will have to use costly 
signals to separate themselves from their counterparts. 
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Almazan et al. (2008) discuss cheap talk in the context of an agency problem 
between managers and shareholders. They present a model where managers who have 
positive information about their firms can use cheap talk in order to attract attention of 
analysts and speculators who, in turn, investigate the firm and produce new information. 
If this information is positive there will be buying pressure on the stock, which will 
increase firm value. The authors prove that the optimal managerial contract in this 
setting includes both a bonus for stock price increases following “cheap talk” and the 
threat of managerial dismissal if the stock price does not increase following “cheap 
talk”. This contract ensures the credibility of “costless” announcements, since they are 
costly for the manager. In this paper we test the empirical predictions of this model and 
confirm that managerial incentives are an important driver for the use of cheap talk 
strategies to transmit information to the market.  
On the empirical front there is ample evidence that markets react favorably to 
seemingly costless announcements such as stock splits, stock dividends, media 
appearances and voluntary announcements. However there is no agreement on whether 
these announcements are really costless; and there are few studies evaluating the cost 
that they may have for the managers who initiate them. 
There is a large empirical literature on the market reaction to stock splits and 
stock dividend announcements. Grinblatt et al. (1984) show that stock splits and stock 
dividend announcements are usually followed by favorable changes in stock prices. 
Lakonishok and Lev (1987) also document a 3 to 5% positive abnormal return around 
the dates of stock split announcements. Ikenberry et al. (1996) find that share 
repurchase announcements have indeed a favorable effect on stock prices but only if the 
firm is undervalued and needs analysts' attention to increase stock value. These authors 
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also document a positive short-term market reaction to stock splits, which is even higher 
when they look in the long run (one to three year periods).  
These results have been explained in two different ways. On the one hand, some 
authors argue that because of transaction costs there is an optimal price range for a 
stock. As pointed by Ball, Brown and Finn (1977, 106-107) share splits sometimes are 
regarded as means of altering market prices of shares to bring them into a more 
"popular" price level and so to "broaden" the market for the share, which presumably 
implies a higher price.2 Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1996) also present evidence 
consistent with this idea. On the other hand, other authors argue that the main role of 
stock splits is to convey information, and that they are credible because they are costly 
for the investors. Brennan and Copeland (1988) argue that splits are credible signals 
because of the increased transaction costs in trading for lower-priced shares. Brennan 
and Hughes (1991) present a model that explains the informational content of stock 
splits given that only managers with good earnings forecasts will conduct stock splits. 
They argue that stock splits will be considered a credible way of attracting attention of 
financial analysts working for brokerage houses, because commissions are decreasing in 
stock price. Therefore, only companies that have good information to convey to the 
market will be willing to incur higher trading costs. Conroy and Harris (1999) address 
the informational content of stock split announcements as well. They find that larger 
split sizes lead to superior analysts’ earnings forecasts, which according to them is a 
direct confirmation of informational context of stock split announcements. However, all 
of these papers only consider the benefits or costs of stock splits from the shareholders' 
point of view and they do not take into account the specific incentives of managers who 
initiate these operations. Therefore, we contribute to the literature on stock splits by 
                                                            
2 Baker and Gallagher (1980), who surveyed executives of firms that split their shares, report that 94% of the interviewees indicated 
that stock splits moved the share price into an "optimal trading range”. 
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providing empirical evidence showing that an alternative explanation for the positive 
market reaction to stock splits is their use by managers who want to attract attention. 
The literature on media coverage also documents positive market reactions to 
increased media attention. Nofsinger (2001) finds that longer articles in the Wall Street 
Journal induce individual investors to trade more. Chan (2003) analyzes the issue of 
media attention and finds that investors underreact to bad news and that, a portfolio of 
firms that receive media attention (for which good or bad news are reported) 
outperforms the portfolio of firms with no news. Therefore it would seem that attracting 
media attention is a strategy that pays off. Dyck and Zingales (2003) find that stock 
prices are more reactive to the earnings that are emphasized by the press. Barber and 
Odean (2007) study and confirm that individual investors are net buyers of attention 
grabbing stocks i.e. stocks in news. Peress (2008) finds that announcements with more 
media coverage (measured by the number of articles in the Wall Street Journal) generate 
higher prices and trading reactions. Kim and Meschke (2011) discover significant 
abnormal returns surrounding CEO interviews broadcasted on CNBS.  Although to 
some degree media coverage is predetermined by the variables that managers cannot 
control (such as firm’s size, industry and macroeconomic events) there is evidence that 
managers can attract media attention and increase the number of times the firm appears 
on the news. In particular, Bushee and Miller (2005) show that firms set up investor 
relations (IR) departments and hire IR consultants with the aim of becoming more 
visible. And after setting up these departments both firm initiated disclosures and 
overall firm media coverage increases significantly. To the extent that managers can 
increase attention that media devotes to their firms, they can attract public attention in a 
cheap way. Our paper contributes to the literature on media attention by showing that 
positive market reactions to increased media attention is consistent with a signaling 
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model in which CEOs have incentives to attract attention and drive prices up, but will 
be punished with a lower salary or a shorter tenure if their strategy fails.  
 Finally, regarding voluntary announcements, management earnings guidance has 
also been proven to be a credible way of disclosing information to the market. Managers 
can use voluntary earnings forecasts to guide investors and analysts through the firm's 
coming earnings and general performance. Recent financial research has examined the 
informational content of CEOs' voluntary earnings forecasts (Anilowski et al., 2007; 
Atiase and Tse, 2010; Das et al., 2012) and found that they have a positive impact on 
stock prices (Patell, 1976; Penman, 1982; Pownall et al., 1993), they reduce information 
asymmetry (Coller and Yohn, 1997; Francis et al., 1997) and affect analyst forecast 
revisions (Baginski and Hassell, 1990; Francis et al., 1997). In this paper we use 
voluntary earnings forecast as one of our measures of cheap talk and document the 
relationship between CEO’s variable compensation and their propensity to make 
voluntary earnings forecasts. Moreover, we also show that CEOs that make voluntary 
announcements are more likely to see their compensation reduced after bad 
performance. Thus, our evidence is consistent with the idea of earnings forecasts being 
credible because they are costly for the manager. 
 To sum it all up, the empirical literature on the effects of “cheap talk” proves 
that many types of voluntary actions, like stock splits, CEO voluntary forecasts or firm 
media coverage, convey valuable information to the market and that they have 
significant effects. Theoretically, unverifiable soft information may be credible for two 
reasons: (i) either they are costly for the firm (e.g. stock splits could lead to higher 
trading costs for the investors) and therefore only “good” firms will make these 
decisions and/or (ii) these are costly for the CEOs because it helps attract analysts' 
attention leading to reassessment of stock value, which will result in a change in both 
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expected CEO compensation and tenure. In this paper we provide evidence consistent 
with the second possibility. 
 Our testable hypotheses are based on the theoretical model of “cheap talk” in 
Almazan et al. (2008). Managers who have positive information about their firms can 
use different actions in order to attract analysts' and/or investors' attention who, in turn, 
investigate the firm, produce new information and correct potential undervaluation 
problems. The actions of the managers are credible because they are costly for them: 
CEO variable compensation can increase if the announcements result in higher stock 
prices, but they may face an increased possibility of dismissal or lower future 
compensation if stock prices decrease following the announcements.  
The empirical literature on signaling has mainly concentrated on traditional 
signals with clear costs, such as leverage and dividends, but, to prove our point, we will 
not use these signals for two reasons. First, although these decisions may attract 
attention, they have a direct impact on the cash flows of the firm, so for these types of 
signals it is difficult to measure which part of the impact may be due to the change in 
expectations. Second, the causality between these measures and managerial incentives is 
more difficult to disentangle. Therefore we prefer to use “cheap talk” actions, and 
concentrate on stock splits, CEO annual voluntary EPS forecasts and firm media 
coverage for which we have a large number of observations. We believe that, although 
stock splits may have an indirect effect on company's finances because of the change in 
the transaction costs for investors, their other important objective is to attract attention. 
Besides, we assume that managerial incentives could be considered as predetermined 
with respect to stock splits, voluntary EPS forecasts and media coverage.  
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Therefore, using the mentioned proxies for cheap talk we test three different 
theoretical predictions from the Almazan et al., (2008) model. First, we test whether 
different managerial remuneration schemes and risk of dismissal are associated with 
more or less "cheap talk" from the part of CEOs. In particular we would expect that 
CEOs with more variable compensation tied to stock market prices would be more 
likely to attract attention through stock splits, EPS forecasts and media coverage. This is 
the first hypothesis to be contrasted: 
Hypothesis 1: CEOs with larger share of variable compensation in their pay 
packages (through either bonuses, shares or stock options) are more likely to be 
associated with increased "cheap talk" by announcing stock splits, issuing 
voluntary EPS forecasts and/or attracting media coverage. 
Second, once the CEO makes the announcement, there are two types of agents 
that will react to it and exercise upward or downward pressure on stock market prices. 
First, professional analysts, whose attention has been attracted by the cheap talk 
(Brennan and Hughes, 1991; Conroy and Harris, 1999). Second, investors who react 
either directly to the announcements or indirectly, by following analysts’ 
recommendations. Thus the second hypothesis that we will test is that: 
Hypothesis 2: Financial analysts following a given firm are more likely to 
upgrade their estimates for the firm announcing a stock split, issuing a voluntary 
EPS forecast and/or attracting media coverage.  
Finally, for these announcements to be credible it is necessary that managers 
cannot play the market, i.e. attracting attention is not a free lunch for CEOs. Thus a 
negative market reaction following an announcement should more likely be correlated 
with a higher probability of dismissal or lower subsequent compensation for the CEO. 
This leads us to our third testable hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 3: The probability of a CEO turnover or lower total compensation is 
higher for those CEOs that fail to obtain a positive market reaction after 
attention attracting announcements.  
 
2.3. Data and Variables  
 
We gather data from different datasets. First, we borrow information on CEOs’ 
pay contracts that are central to the study from EXECUCOMP. The period to be 
analyzed covers 1992-2011. We filter executive data using the flag CEO that indicates 
that the person served as an executive for all or most of the fiscal year. We obtain 
information for 6,806 CEOs serving for 3,333 firms. The total firm-year panel adds up 
to 33,830 observations. Second, we extract market and accounting information from 
COMPUSTAT. We also employ I/B/E/S database for analyst estimates. We obtain data 
on stock split announcements from CRSP. We get information about CEO annual EPS 
forecasts from Thomson First Call database - Company Issued Guidelines (CIG), and 
finally, we obtain media coverage data form Factiva database.  
2.3.1. Cheap Talk Variables 
Stock Splits 
Our first proxy for cheap talk is Stock Splits, which we construct as a dummy 
variable that takes on the value of one whenever the company announces a stock split in 
a given fiscal year. We have 2,406 stock split announcements in total. A total of 1,439 
firms out of 3,333 announce a stock split at least once throughout the sample period. 
Out of the splitting firms 58% announce it only once in our 20 year sample period. 
Annual distribution of stock splits (see Figure 1) shows a clear time pattern with most of 
the splits happening before year 2001 and declining afterwards.  
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[Insert Figure 1 about Here] 
CEO annual EPS forecasts 
We use Thomson First Call database - Company Issued Guidelines (CIG) to 
construct our second proxy for managerial cheap talk. In particular, we employ CEO 
annual earnings forecasts, often referred to as "earnings guidance" issued in firm's press 
releases within the year until the actual earnings are released. The variable we construct 
is the number of times CEO issues annual EPS forecasts in a given fiscal year i.e. the 
number of times a manager issues voluntary forecasts that may attract analysts' and 
investors' attention. Figure 2 shows the distribution of EPS forecasts across years. 
Forecasts have become much more common after 2001. This might be related to the 
issuance of a new regulatory rule - Regulation on Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) - by the 
SEC at the end of 2000, which forbid selective disclosures to large investors and 
analysts. The new rule required the placement of most company announcements in press 
releases to be accessible by the general public.   
In order to make sure that the forecasts are voluntary in nature we have 
computed that only 57% (1,913) of the firms in the sample make EPS forecasts. Out of 
the forecasting firms only 49% have announced EPS forecasts in more than 4 years. 
Finally, 25 % of the announcing firms issue one forecast per year and 14% of firms 
issue more than six forecasts per year (See annual frequency of forecasts on figure 2). 
Thus we can conclude that not every firm forecasts EPS and, more importantly, 
announcing firms may modify their policies over time.  
[Insert Figure 2 about Here] 
 Interestingly, there has been a growing interest in this database due to its instant 
availability for research purposes. Chuk et al. (2012) assess the methods of identifying 
management forecasts in the First Call database as compared to a randomly selected 
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sample of hand collected CEO forecasts from press releases. They find that 30% of the 
data is not available on the CIG database or, if they are available, a big part is 
mistakenly reported in a date not falling within the 5 day window around the true 
announcement date. This raises some concerns regarding the reliability of the database. 
However, we are only interested in the number of announcements and not the exact date 
of the announcements. Moreover, Chuk et al. (2012) do not report a bias in the missing 
data, and, in the worst case the lack of data would probably work against our 
expectations.  
Firm Media Coverage  
We construct our third measure of cheap talk by employing the Factiva database 
– a business and information research tool containing numerous sources of news 
(newspapers, journals, newswires etc.). Our research design gears towards collecting all 
the articles within Factiva that have been written about a specific firm during a given 
fiscal period (our main filter for the search is that the firm's name should have been 
mentioned in the headline or the main paragraph of the given article). The number of 
articles is taken as the measure of firm media coverage. We understand that the measure 
has many limitations. First and foremost, it fails to perfectly account for managerial 
efforts to attract attention but rather it concentrates on the actions taken by the media. 
Second, the variable does not distinguish between good vs. bad news and thus limits our 
understanding of the content. On the other hand, we had an option to further filter our 
search by only allowing press release wires (the main tool through which firms 
communicate to media) as the sole source of information. It would have picked up 
CEOs' efforts to exercise "cheap talk" more precisely, though this approach would also 
have had its limitations - it does not provide the strength of the "cheap talk" i.e. how 
does the media pick up the initial dissemination of the news which is ultimately what is 
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the goal of attracting attention. So for this research we stick to the general media 
coverage of firms. 
We were able to collect over 18,800 observations for 2,303 firms for the 1998-
2011 period. Mean media coverage for the whole sample is 359 articles per fiscal year. 
The distribution of average annual media coverage across years is provided in Figure 3, 
which shows average media coverage increasing over the years. Figure 3 also presents 
media coverage divided by size deciles. The median indicates that 50% of the firms 
appear in less than 142 articles per fiscal year. The maximum number for media 
coverage in the sample is 23,531 articles for one company in one year. As expected, 
media coverage shows wide dispersion, and in order to get rid of the outliers we trim the 
variable at 2.5% from below and above (i.e. we get rid of media coverage less than 1 
and more that 2500, though the results do not change radically if we include them). 
 [Insert Figure 3 about Here] 
2.3.2. CEO Specific Variables 
 
We define Variable Compensation as the ratio of variable compensation to the 
total compensation in CEOs' remuneration packages. Total compensation and its 
components are retrieved from the EXECUCOMP database. The variable part of the 
total remuneration is constructed by adding up the most recently granted bonuses, 
options and stocks to CEOs in a given fiscal year.3 The final variable used in the paper 
is the share of the variable part in CEO’s total compensation. We decided to focus on 
the most recent grants of stocks and options because they provide the longest term pay-
                                                            
3 We use BONUS+ OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE (Total Value of Stock Options Granted-using Black-Scholes) + 
RSTKGNT (Value of Restricted Stock Granted) as variable compensation for 1992-2005 and – BONUS+ OPTION_AWARDS_FV 
(Grant-Date Fair Value of Option Awards) + STOCK_AWARDS_FV (Grant-Date Fair Value of Stock Awards) - in 2006-2011 
observations, as stated in the definition of TDC1 variable. 
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for-performance incentives for the CEOs. We also tried other alternative measures of 
variable compensation consisting of the mix of previously granted exercisable and 
unexercisable options and vested and unvested stocks, and the results do not differ 
significantly. 
As an alternative measure of pay-for-performance sensitivities we also compute 
the CEO’s stock and option delta i.e. the change of the portfolio value of stocks and 
options for a 1% change in the stock price. The measure is extensively used in the 
managerial compensation literature and is calculated as a partial derivative of the Black 
and Scholes (1973) option value with respect to stock price. We follow Core and Guay 
(2002) method for calculating the variable. 
Figure 4 depicts the composition of CEO variable compensation. The share of 
bonuses in the total variable compensation decreased substantially over these 20 years, 
whereas the share of stocks granted to the CEOs increased more than 6 times, from 9% 
in 1992 to 59% in 2011. The average share of options in CEO compensation packages 
did not change dramatically in the past years, though certain cyclicality is noticeable 
given that there is an increase in this ratio at the beginning of the period and then a 
decrease from 2002 on.  
[Insert Figure 4 about Here] 
CEO variable compensation and compensation delta across years are provided in 
Figure 5. Variable compensation shows a steady increase until 2004 and drops since 
then. Compensation delta seems to be more cyclical with no apparent trend. Average 
delta is 0.18 throughout the sample indicating that a 1 % change in stock price leads to 
an average change of $180,000 in the value of the CEO's portfolio of stocks and 
options.   
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 [Insert Figure 5 about Here] 
Other than pay-for-performance sensitive compensation, we also employ 
inflation adjusted total CEO compensation in our analysis. 
  CEO Turnover measures CEO replacements. Given the difficulties in 
distinguishing between voluntary and forced removals we take all CEO replacements as 
forceful, though in order to account for possible retirements we are censoring the 
variable by age<60 (Coates and Kraakman, 2006; Kanaan, 2008). We identify 1,840 
CEO replacements in the sample (with age <60). We also find that 52% of the replacing 
firms change their CEOs only once in the 20 year period.   
There are two other CEO specific variables – CEO age and CEO tenure - in the 
sample, both of which are retrieved from EXECUCOMP database. Tenure is calculated 
as the current year minus the year the person became CEO.  
2.3.3. Firm Specific Variables 
 
The main sources of firm specific data are COMPUSTAT and CRSP databases. 
The choice of the variables was mainly inspired by CEO compensation and turnover 
literature, as well as theoretical papers on information disclosure. 
Leverage ratio, defined as total debt of the firm divided by its total equity, is 
often used as one of the explanatory firm specific variables while studying CEO 
remuneration contracts and turnover (Brick et al., 2006; Coates and Kraakman, 2006; 
Garvey and Milbourn, 2006; Kaplan and Minton, 2012). 
Market to book ratio – defined as total market value of a firm (share market 
price multiplied by total shares outstanding) divided by the book value of firm’s equity. 
This variable is a measure of firm overvaluation, which is also very commonly used in 
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the literature (Lakonishok et al., 1994; Ikenberry et al., 1996; Bhattacharya and Dittmar, 
2008). 
Total assets (in logs) are used as a proxy for firms’ size (Coates and Kraakman, 
2006). Data are extracted from COMPUSTAT. 
Firm returns are annual returns (stock price changes) at the end of each fiscal 
year.  
Analyst following is extracted from I/B/E/S (DATASTREAM) database and 
measures the number of analysts issuing earnings forecasts of a firm in a given fiscal 
year. In addition, we are going to employ the cumulative annual number of estimates 
that have been lowered and increased, since we believe that capturing the change in the 
value of issued firm EPS may represent a more qualitative measure of analyst following 
than the total number of analysts that have been following the firm.  
Detailed summary statistics of all variables are given in Table 1. We drop the 
outliers before continuing with the analysis (leverage and market-to-book ratios that 
have values less than 0 or more than 100, also returns greater than 200% or lower than -
100% are dropped from the sample). 
[Insert Table 1 about Here] 
Table 2 reports the comparative statistics when we separate the sample into two 
groups depending on their use of cheap talk measures in a given year. Companies 
announcing a stock split, making voluntary earnings forecasts and receiving substantial 
media attention are classified as trying to attract attention. The tests of mean differences 
in the variables of the cheap talking years and the rest of the sample show that cheap 
talking firms tend to be larger, more overvalued, better performing, have more analyst 
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following and pay their CEOs more generous compensation packages with higher pay-
for-performance sensitivities.  
 [Insert Table 2 about Here] 
 
2.4. Research Design and Results 
  
2.4.1. CEO Remuneration and Cheap Talk 
 
Our first testable hypothesis is that the CEOs who receive more variable 
compensation are more likely to attract attention through cheap talk i.e. stock splits, 
EPS forecast announcements and firm media coverage. 
In order to test this hypothesis we first estimate the following logistic model for 
the probability that a firm makes a stock split announcement. 
ࡿ࢖࢒࢏࢚࢙࢏,࢚ 	ൌ 		ࢇ ൅	ࢼ૚ ∗ ࢂࢇ࢘࢏ࢇ࢈࢒ࢋ_࡯࢕࢓࢖࢏,࢚ି૚	 ൅ 	ࢼ૛ ∗ ࡸ࢕ࢍሺ࡭࢙࢙ࢋ࢚࢙ሻ࢏,࢚ି૚	 ൅ ࢼ૜ ∗
																																			ࡸࢋ࢜ࢋ࢘ࢇࢍࢋ࢏,࢚ି૚	 ൅ 	ࢼ૝ ∗ ࡹࢇ࢘࢑ࢋ࢚ࢀ࢕࡮࢕࢕࢑࢏,࢚ି૚	 ൅ ࢼ૞ ∗ ࡾࢋ࢚࢛࢘࢔࢙࢏,࢚ି૚	 ൅
																																					ࢼ૟ ∗ ࡯ࡱࡻ_ࢀࢋ࢔࢛࢘ࢋ࢏,࢚ି૚	 ൅	ࢼૠ ∗ ࡯ࡱࡻ_࡭ࢍࢋ࢏,࢚ି૚	 ൅ 	ࣆ࢏,࢚		 ൅ 	ࣖ࢏,࢚		            (1) 
Where, 
ࡼ࢘ሺࡿ࢖࢒࢏࢚࢙࢏,࢚ 	ൌ ૚ห	ࢄ૚,࢚ି૚	, ࢄ૛,࢚ି૚	 …ࢄ࢑,࢚ି૚	൯ ൌ 	 ૚૚ ൅	܍ିሺ܉ା∑઺ܒ∗܆ܒሻ 
The left hand side of the equation (1) states the probability of a stock split 
announcement conditionally on Xs - the vector of explanatory variables. These 
explanatory variables include our main independent variable - CEO Variable 
Compensation and other lagged control variables for the firm. 	ࣆ࢏,࢚		 stands for fixed 
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effects - firm-specific time-invariant characteristics. The regression also includes year 
dummies.  
We also conduct two separate fixed effects OLS estimations which alternatively 
use the number of CEO annual EPS forecasts and Firm Media Coverage as proxies for 
our dependent variable, cheap talk. Our main explanatory control in these models is 
CEO Variable Compensation. 
࡯ࢎࢋࢇ࢖_ࢀࢇ࢒࢑࢏,࢚ ൌ 	ࢇ ൅	ࢼ૚ ∗ ࢂࢇ࢘࢏ࢇ࢈࢒ࢋ_࡯࢕࢓࢖࢏,࢚ି૚	 ൅ 	ࢼ૛ ∗ ࡸ࢕ࢍሺ࡭࢙࢙ࢋ࢚࢙ሻ࢏,࢚ି૚	 ൅ ࢼ૜
∗ 		ࡸࢋ࢜ࢋ࢘ࢇࢍࢋ࢏,࢚ି૚	 ൅	ࢼ૝ ∗ ࡹࢇ࢘࢑ࢋ࢚ࢀ࢕࡮࢕࢕࢑࢏,࢚ି૚	 ൅ ࢼ૞ ∗ ࡾࢋ࢚࢛࢘࢔࢙࢏,࢚ି૚	
൅ 	 	ࢼ૟ ∗ ࡯ࡱࡻ_ࢀࢋ࢔࢛࢘ࢋ࢏,࢚ି૚	൅	ࢼૠ ∗ ࡯ࡱࡻ_࡭ࢍࢋ࢏,࢚ି૚	 ൅ ࣆ࢏,࢚		 ൅ 	ࣖ࢏,࢚		 
 (2)     
Equation (2) is a OLS regression where the dependent variable is alternatively 
measured as the number of CEO annual EPS forecasts and Firm Media Coverage. All 
the explanatory variables, including CEO Variable Compensation, are lagged one 
period and considered as predetermined, implying that the type and characteristics of a 
firm today affects its future decisions. 	ࣆ࢏,࢚		 stands for fixed effects - firm-specific time-
invariant characteristics. The regressions also include year dummies. 
 The results of the estimations are provided in Table 3 which shows that CEO 
pay-for-performance sensitivities, both in terms of the proportion of variable 
compensation and compensation delta, are associated with positive and significant 
values for all our measures of cheap talk. 
Other CEO characteristics are also noteworthy. The effect of CEOs' age on the 
probability of cheap talk is negative and statistically significant, probably due to the fact 
that older CEOs might have less career concerns. CEO tenure is positively correlated 
with the probability of splits (but not with EPS forecasts and media coverage), which 
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can be explained by the possibility that entrenched CEOs might have more incentives 
(or need) to attract attention compared to the newcomers who already attract some kind 
of attention by joining the firm.  
[Insert Table 3 about Here] 
Regarding other firm characteristics, the impact of size is positive and 
significant. Bigger firms might have higher pressure for providing better disclosure. 
Returns are positive only in the case of stock split which is intuitive as better 
performing CEOs will have to split increased share prices at some point in the future. 
Leverage and market to book ratios are mainly inconclusive. 
2.4.2 Cheap Talk and Analysts Following 
 
Before testing the hypothesis on the consequences of attracting attention, we 
study whether there is a middle stage connecting cheap talk to changes in market prices. 
In particular, whether the transfer of soft information to the market is channeled through 
specialists like financial analysts i.e. we are testing Hypothesis 2. In order to check 
whether this intermediate chain of action works in practice, we test whether cheap talk 
measures attract analysts' attention, estimating the following three models:  
࡭࢔ࢇ࢒࢙࢚࢟_ࡲ࢕࢒࢒࢕࢝࢏࢔ࢍ࢏,࢚ 	ൌ 		ࢻ ൅	ࢼ૚ ∗ ࡯ࢎࢋࢇ࢖_࢚ࢇ࢒࢑࢏,࢚ି૚	 ൅ 	∑	ࢼ࢐ࢄ࢏,࢚ି૚	 ൅ 	ࣆ࢏,࢚		 ൅ 	ࣖ࢏,࢚		 
(3) 
࡭࢔ࢇ࢒࢙࢚࢙࢟_ࢁࡼ࢏,࢚ 	ൌ 		ࢻ ൅	ࢼ૚ ∗ ࡯ࢎࢋࢇ࢖_࢚ࢇ࢒࢑࢏,࢚ି૚	 ൅ 	∑	ࢼ࢐ࢄ࢏,࢚ି૚	 ൅ 	ࣆ࢏,࢚		 ൅ 	ࣖ࢏,࢚		 
              (4) 
࡭࢔ࢇ࢒࢙࢚࢙࢟_ࡰࡻࢃࡺ࢏,࢚ 	ൌ 		ࢻ ൅	ࢼ૚ ∗ ࡯ࢎࢋࢇ࢖_࢚ࢇ࢒࢑࢏,࢚ି૚	 ൅ 	∑	ࢼ࢐ࢄ࢏,࢚ି૚	 ൅ 	ࣆ࢏,࢚		 ൅ 	ࣖ࢏,࢚		 
       (5) 
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Where, Analyst Following stands for the number of analysts issuing EPS estimates 
for a specific firm in a given fiscal year. Analyst Following UPs and Analyst Following 
DOWNs measure respectively the annual number of EPS estimates that have been 
increased and lowered by the analysts in a given year. Cheap-talk is the means of 
attracting attention (i.e. stock split announcements, number of EPS forecasts and media 
coverage). Xi represents the vector of other lagged explanatory variables also used 
earlier in the study. ࣆ࢏,࢚		 stands for fixed effects - firm-specific time-invariant 
characteristics. The regressions also include year dummies. 
The results of these regressions are provided in Table 4 which indicates that all the 
proxies of cheap talk: stock splits, EPS forecasts and firm media coverage serve to 
attract analysts following. When we look at the number of analysts upgrading their EPS 
estimates we also see that all our measures of cheap talk are positively and significantly 
related to the number of upgrades. Interestingly when we look at downgrades, we 
observe that more splits and media attention lead to both more upgrades and also to 
more downgrades. Though what we would expect to see is the decrease in the number 
of downgrades following cheap talk like in the case of CEO EPS forecasts.   
[Insert Table 4 about Here] 
2.4.3 CEO Turnover and Compensation Following Cheap Talk 
 
Our third hypothesis refers to the costs that the CEO will face if he cheats when 
using cheap talk, i.e. when he tries to attract attention and drive prices up in the short 
run even though there is no positive information to communicate, and thus prices are 
going to drop in the long run. To test Hypothesis 3, we use the same type of estimation 
methods as we did for Hypothesis 1. In particular, we estimate the following models:   
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	ࢀ࢛࢘࢔࢕࢜ࢋ࢘࢏,࢚ 	ൌ 		ࢇ ൅	ࢼ૚ ∗ ࡯ࢎࢋࢇ࢖_࢚ࢇ࢒࢑࢏,࢚ି૚	 ൅ 	ࢼ૛ ∗ ࡯ࢎࢋࢇ࢖_࢚ࢇ࢒࢑࢏,࢚ି૚	 ∗ ࡾࢋ࢚࢛࢘࢔࢙࢏,࢚ି૚	 ൅
																																																															∑	ࢼ࢐ࢄ࢏,࢚ି૚	 ൅ 			ࣆ࢏,࢚		 ൅ 	ࣖ࢏,࢚																																				                (6) 
Where, 
ࡼ࢘ሺࡲ࢏࢘࢏࢔ࢍ࢙࢏,࢚ 	ൌ ૚ห	ࢄ૚,࢚ି૚	, ࢄ૛,࢚ି૚	 …ࢄ࢑,࢚ି૚	൯ ൌ 	 ૚૚ ൅	܍ିሺ܉ା∑઺ܒ∗܆ܑሻ 
           And, 
ࢀ࢕࢚ࢇ࢒_࡯࢕࢓࢖ࢋ࢔࢙ࢇ࢚࢏࢕࢔࢏,࢚ ൌ 	ࢻ ൅	ࢼ૚ ∗ ࡯ࢎࢋࢇ࢖_࢚ࢇ࢒࢑࢏,࢚ି૚	 ൅ ࢼ૛ ∗ ࡯ࢎࢋࢇ࢖_࢚ࢇ࢒࢑࢏,࢚ି૚ ∗
																																																														ࡾࢋ࢚࢛࢘࢔࢙࢏,࢚ି૚	 ൅ 	∑	ࢼ࢐ࢄ࢏,࢚ି૚	 ൅ 	ࣆ࢏,࢚		 ൅ 	ࣖ࢏,࢚		                  (7) 
Where, equation (6) is a logistic model stating the probability of CEO turnover 
conditionally on control variables (also used in previous models). Equation (7) 
represents OLS regression for estimating the changes in CEOs' total compensation 
following cheap talk. ࣆ࢏,࢚		 stands for fixed effects - firm-specific time-invariant 
characteristics. The regressions also include year dummies. Both regressions are 
estimated separately for all proxies of cheap talk (Splits, Forecasts and Media 
Coverage). Our controls of interest is an interaction terms between cheap talk and firm 
performance (ࢼ૛′࢙ሻ. 
In order to accurately test Hypothesis 3 we have to identify the effect of cheap 
talk on CEO turnover through bad stock performance. Therefore, since we have exact 
dates for stock split announcements, we measure abnormal returns around the 
announcements and include them in the regression as control variables together with 
stock splits. When we use CEO EPS forecasts and media coverage as measures of cheap 
talk we include the interaction term between these variables and returns. According to 
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Hypothesis 3 we expect this interaction term to be significant: low market returns are 
more likely to be punished with higher probability of turnovers for those CEOs who 
engage in cheap talk in order to attract market’s attention.  
For computing abnormal returns around stock split announcements, we conduct 
a conventional event study analysis (MacKinlay, 1997). We first estimate normal stock 
return performance for each firm during 200 days before the announcements using 
market model. Specifically, we estimate normal stock returns for a window of 230 days 
to 30 days before the announcements. Then, we take actual stock returns in an event 
window of 2 days before and after split announcement days (i.e. 5 days event window). 
We finally calculate abnormal returns as actual returns (in an event window) minus 
predicted normal returns for the same period (using the previous 200 days 
performance). By adding up the values for the five event days (-2,-1,0,+1,+2) we get 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). In addition, we calculate t-statistics for each of 
the abnormal returns for testing their significance. 
We get 2,257 CAR values for 2406 stock split announcements. After filtering 
the values by their significance at the 5% level (i.e. keeping only the values with more 
than 1.96 or less than -1.96 of t-statistics), we end up with only 235 significant CARs. 
The average significant CAR is 3%.  
We also include control variables taken from the existing empirical literature on 
CEO replacements (Coates and Kraakman, 2006; Jenter and Kanaan, 2006; Kaplan and 
Minton, 2012).  
The results of the estimation of the probability of CEO turnover and changes in 
total compensation are shown in Table 5 for all our measures of cheap talk. The first 
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columns present estimation results for model 6 and the second columns for model 7. 
The outcomes are in accordance with Hypothesis 3 for selected measures of cheap talk.  
First we look at the effects of using cheap talk on posterior CEO turnover. In the 
case of stock splits we find that the higher the abnormal returns following stock split 
announcements the lower the probability of a CEO change and vice versa. Executives 
who experience negative market reactions face an increased probability of separation 
from the firms. Interestingly, stock split announcements by themselves seem to have a 
negative effect on the probability of CEOs being replaced. We connect this relationship 
to the aforementioned explanation on liquidity: stock splits' primary goal is to decrease 
previously inflated stock prices to the efficient range in order to boost liquidity. Such 
liquidity increase reduces the likelihood of CEO Turnover. The coefficient on the 
interaction terms between performance and our alternative measures of cheap talk, EPS 
forecasts and media coverage, are also negative, though insignificant.  
Second, when we look at the impact of cheap talk on posterior changes in total 
CEO compensation we see that the interaction term between performance and our three 
cheap talk measures is positive and significant. This indicates that using cheap talk 
makes CEOs' compensation more sensible to stock market performance. Thus we 
conclude that using cheap talk is not cheap for the CEO, since it may lead to decreases 
in his total compensation when cheap talk is not followed by good stock market 
performance.  
It is also interesting to analyze other control variables. Consistent with previous 
studies we find that managers that receive compensation with higher pay-for 
performance sensitivities are less likely to face turnover (Coates and Kraakman, 2006).  
Also, as expected stock returns are negatively associated with turnover and positively 
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correlated with higher subsequent CEO compensation (except for media coverage). 
Leverage and market-to-book ratios are mainly inconclusive. The size of the firm is an 
important determinant both for CEO turnover and total compensation: in all cases the 
effect of the size is positive. Bigger firms might be under more pressure and scrutiny to 
act "appropriately" when CEOs underperform, at the same time larger firms have highly 
remunerated managers. CEO age is negatively related to both turnover and 
compensation. Tenure seems to be negatively related to turnover and positively related 
to total compensation, which is an indicator of CEO entrenchment.  
[Insert Table 5 about Here] 
 
2.5. Robustness Checks 
 
 One of the issues that we address in the robustness analysis is the composition of 
CEO variable compensation. A large number of researchers agree that stock and stock 
option ownerships provide the largest CEO performance incentives. Murphy (1999) 
claims that “pay-performance sensitivities are driven primarily by stock options and 
stock ownership and not through other forms of compensation”. Tables 6 and 7 show 
the results of the hypotheses (1) and (3) by decomposing Variable Compensation in its 
three components – bonuses, stock ownerships and stock options. Table 6 shows that 
the effect all three measures of CEO variable compensation (bonuses, options and 
stocks) are significantly positively associated with split announcements. Bonuses and 
option holdings are the ones that are positively correlated with CEO earnings forecasts 
and stocks and options seem to be more effective for firm media coverage. Other 
researchers also find evidence of how managerial pay incentives can affect their 
motivation to disclose information. Aboody and Kasznik (2000) find that CEO forecasts 
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may be attempted to depress stock price just before option grants to take advantage of 
the lowering strike price of the granted options. Rogers and Stocken (2005) find that 
managers might be provided with incentives to issue optimistic forecasts in an attempt 
to dispose of their options at a higher price. 
[Insert Table 6 about Here] 
In addition, options and bonuses represent the significant parts of remuneration 
associated with a lower probability of CEO turnover i.e. better performing CEOs (high 
bonuses) make them more secure at their posts. 
[Insert Table 7 about Here] 
For further analysis we divide the sample in two subsamples: first period covers 
1992-2001 and the second - 2002-2011. The rationale behind this break up is mainly 
empirical - end of 2000 marks the enactment of Regulation FD by SEC which promoted 
more transparent information dissemination practices which is very relevant to our 
study. CEO EPS forecasts are shown to be less frequently presented in the beginning of 
the sample (see Figure 2). On the contrary, stock split announcements have been more 
frequent before 2001 (see Figure 1). Finally, if we take a look at Figure 1 we can see 
that market returns have almost always been positive before 2001 and it shows more 
ups and downs after 2001. The results of testing Hypothesis 1 are provided in Table 8. 
We find that the effect of CEO incentives have been more powerful for stock splits in 
the "expansive" period (1992-2001) rather than in the "recessive" one (2002-2011). 
CEO EPS forecasts seem to be more affected by the variable compensation in the later 
period. (We skip firm media coverage for this test since we start collecting it starting in 
1998). 
[Insert Table 8 about Here] 
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2.6. Summary and Conclusions 
 
The problem that CEOs' and shareholders’ interests are not aligned has long been 
analyzed in agency theory literature. Different measures have been suggested to 
alleviate the problem. One of the most popular ones is to link CEOs’ compensation to 
market returns (e.g. offering managers a proportion of their compensation in stock-
related instruments like shares or stock options).  
Remarkably, managers can affect, at least in the short term, market performance by 
transferring relevant firm information to stock markets. So shareholders should take into 
consideration the effect of information disclosure when designing/offering managerial 
compensation packages. 
This paper addresses the mentioned issue and studies whether the design of CEO 
compensation contracts affects the transfer of unverifiable firm-specific information to 
the markets by attracting attention of analysts/investors. These analysts/investors, in 
turn, monitor the firm and produce new information that eventually increases firm value 
and corrects potential undervaluation problems. In order to trigger this process 
managers have to receive correct incentives (i.e. contracts with a significant proportion 
of variable compensation). More specifically, managers whose compensation packages 
are significantly related to stock market performance will have more incentives to 
attract investors’ attention by implementing cheap talk initiatives like stock splits, CEO 
EPS forecasts or media coverage. We find strong results that an increase in CEO 
variable compensation is correlated with the increase in the probability of stock split 
announcements, the frequency of issuing voluntary EPS forecasts and firm media 
coverage. 
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However, for these actions to be credible and effective in attracting investors’ 
attention, they must have some cost for the manager. This cost relies on the fact that a 
CEO who is attracting market’s attention is expected to be penalized to a larger extent 
when she/he underperforms the market. In order to test accurately such contention we 
have distinguished between stock split announcements that have generated significant 
positive abnormal returns from those that have not. Also, we employ interaction term of 
firm returns and CEO cheap talk to check their joint effects. Once we use CEO turnover 
as proxy for managerial punishment we find out that better firm performance following 
cheap talk are associated with the decrease in the probability of CEO replacements. In 
addition, cheap talking and better performing CEOs seem also to have higher total 
compensations the following year.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Managerial Incentives for Disclosure and Firm Investor Base 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
 Many managers routinely make voluntary earnings forecasts that guide investors 
and analysts through the firm's coming earnings and general performance. Recent 
financial research has shown that these voluntary earnings forecasts are a valuable tool 
for disclosing information to the market. Different authors have examined the 
informational content of CEO voluntary earnings forecasts (Anilowski et al., 2007; 
Atiase and Tse, 2010; Das et al., 2012) and found that they affect stock prices (Patell, 
1976; Penman, 1980; Pownall et al., 1993), information asymmetry (Coller and Yohn, 
1997; Francis et al., 1997) and analysts' forecasts (Baginski and Hassell, 1990; Francis 
et al., 1997).  
 Managers can make voluntary disclosures in order to align investors' 
expectations about the firm with their own (Ajinkya and Gift, 1984). In fact, voluntary 
disclosures are believed to alleviate information asymmetry between shareholders and 
managers (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991), reduce the cost of capital for the firm 
(Botosan, 1997), increase analyst following and thus attract attention in order to correct 
stock valuation problems (Healy et al.,1999; Almazan et al., 2008), reduce managers' 
expected litigation (Skinner, 1994; Kaznik and Lev, 1995) and firing risks (Lee et al., 
2010) and preserve or improve their reputation and credibility (Gibbins et al., 1990, 
Hutton and Stocken, 2009, Graham et al., 2012). However managers may also use 
voluntary disclosures to alter stock market prices in ways that can make their option 
packages more profitable (Aboody and Kasznik, 2000; Rogers and Stocken, 2005).  
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Therefore, the degree to which voluntary managerial disclosures, successfully 
and credibly, align the expectations of investors with their own depends, on the one 
hand, on executives' ex ante motivation to disclose truthful information and, on the 
other hand, on the  investors ability to understand and verify the supplied information 
and scrutinize the incentives of the manager. When the manager makes a voluntary 
disclosure of a good piece of news (i.e., a higher than expected earnings forecasts), 
investors will revise their expectations and drive prices upwards, but only if they can 
verify the information or if they believe that the manager is providing truthful 
information. Therefore, the credibility of the manager will depend on his incentives 
affected by his remuneration package and on whether investors believe this package 
leads the manager to make truthful revelations or induces him to try to alter artificially 
stock prices.  
In this paper I study the complex relationship between voluntary earning 
announcements, CEO compensation and investors' reaction to these announcements. I 
do this by studying the different trading behavior of small and large investors around 
voluntary earnings announcements taking into consideration that they have different 
levels of sophistication (i.e. skills to analyze supplied information). Thus I expect their 
ability to verify the announcements and the credibility they lend to these 
announcements, depending on managerial remuneration contracts, to be different. 
Accordingly, I expect that small and large investors will react differently to the 
voluntary announcements depending on their information sets and their different level 
of analysis of managerial incentives. Moreover, I also expect that, by anticipating 
different reaction of small and large investors, managers will choose different disclosure 
policies depending on their investor base.  
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To test these hypotheses I use a sample of 1085 voluntary earnings 
announcements for the period 2002-2010 and study the trading behavior of large and 
small investors around announcement dates, depending on the informational content of 
the announcements and the investors’ evaluation of the incentives provided in the 
CEOs' remuneration packages.  
Consistent with previous findings by other authors, I find that small and large 
investors react differently to voluntary earnings announcements. In particular, my first 
finding is that small investors are the ones driving up prices after a positive 
announcement (announcements higher than previous forecasts) through abnormal net 
buying activities, while large investors play a contrarian strategy, exhibiting net 
abnormal sales when announcements are too optimistic (announcements higher than ex-
post realized earnings). The first finding confirms that large investors are more 
sophisticated. While small investors always buy after positive announcements, large 
investors have their own earnings estimation and follow a contrarian strategy when 
managerial announcements are too optimistic. Thus large investors can take advantage 
of the anticipated behavior of small investors. 
However, I also find that, although small investors lack information and follow a 
simple trading strategy, they are not naïve; they understand the influence of managerial 
incentives on voluntary announcements. Specifically, I find that small investors react 
less to managerial announcements when the CEO’s compensation package has higher-
pay-for-performance sensitivity, which could give the manager incentives to manipulate 
market prices. However, large investors are more sophisticated than small ones. They 
treat managerial variable compensation packages more as a means of alignment of 
interests between managers and shareholders which makes managerial announcements 
more credible. In addition, large investors reveal even more level of sophistication when 
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they distinguish between long-term awards of stocks and options to CEOs from the 
portfolios of vested stocks and exercisable options that could induce managers to 
temporarily move prices to take advantage of these short term incentives.  
Finally, I find that, anticipating this different behavior of large and small 
investors, CEOs take into account their investor base when designing disclosure 
policies. Voluntary earnings announcements are more likely and more optimistic in 
companies with a larger share of small investors.  
 The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing 
literature and presents the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and variables. 
Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
3.2. Related Literature and Contribution 
 
 There are several strands of the financial literature that are relevant to this paper 
and to which I intend to contribute.  
The first strand of the literature that is relevant for this study is the literature on 
the differences between small and large investors. Researchers distinguish between 
large informed and small uninformed investor based on their levels of sophistication in 
processing information. Sophisticated investors (like institutions, large shareholders 
etc.) may have better financial education and more dedication to concentrate on 
investing decisions, thus they may have superior abilities to evaluate the relevant factors 
related to disclosed information and may arrive at more profitable trading decisions. 
Moreover, they are able of computing fundamental values of different financial assets in 
order to compare their own assessments with those provided by other agents like CEOs 
or financial analysts. On the contrary, small and unsophisticated investors have no skills 
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for computing fundamental values of different financial assets like firms’ stocks, so they 
could be misled by CEOs or financial analysts' forecasts into suboptimal investment 
choices.  
The first papers on this literature concentrated on explaining why large investors 
differ from small ones. Large investors may have more experience with forecasts 
(Yunker and Krehbiel, 1988; Potter, 1992) or might have followed a larger number of 
stocks (Barber and Odean, 2000). Besides, the costs of acquiring information, like the 
access to databases, might be lower for big and experienced investors (Wilson, 1975; 
Lev, 1988).  
 More recent papers on this literature have confirmed that large and small 
investors react differently to new information and announcements made by firms. 
Bartov et al. (2000) take institutional holdings (IH) as a measure of investor 
sophistication and find that stock price reactions to announcements of the firms with 
low IH exhibit the pattern more attributable to unsophisticated investors (returns follow 
random walk). Whereas, stock returns of the firms with high IH follow a Brown-Rozeff 
process, which is consistent with the expectations of sophisticated investors. Battalio 
and Mendenhall (2005) address this issue in their research about earnings expectations 
and investor clientele. They find that small traders hold earnings expectations that 
resemble a seasonal random walk forecasts (SRW - which assumes that current quarter 
earnings will be the same as the last year's relevant quarters'), and their biased beliefs 
are causing the post earnings announcement drift. They also find that large investors’ 
buying behavior is in line with the analysts' forecast errors. Allee et al. (2007) find that 
only less sophisticated investors respond to announcements of pro-forma earnings and 
their placement in press releases. Bhattacharya et al. (2007) also explore the 
characteristics of traders on CEO pro forma earnings announcements. These 
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announcements are considered by many as an opportunistic attempt to mislead investors 
since they are suspected to omit some non-cash items to overstate real earnings. The 
authors find the highest abnormal net buying activities around such announcements are 
initiated from unsophisticated investors. Mikhail et al. (2007) also try to shed some light 
on the trading skills of different investor types. The authors find that small traders seem 
to trade more in response to all forecasts and recommendations of the analysts 
(downgrade or upgrade, sell or buy), whereas large investors react only to the 
downgrade/sell recommendations. This latter result is in accordance with the advanced 
level of information processing skills of large investors given the assumption that 
analyst forecasts are upward biased. Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2009) find that 
large and sophisticated investors are capable of filtering relevant information whereas 
small investors fail to do so. In particular, the authors find that small and 
unsophisticated traders respond with a buying strategy to all kinds of forecast updates 
from analysts, whereas informed investors respond to the direction of announcements - 
positive vs. negative. The authors conclude that analysts communicate in "different 
tongues" while addressing to different audiences - sophisticated vs. unsophisticated – 
and, in turn, these two classes of investors respond according to their expectations.  
My first aim in this paper is to confirm the results of the discussed literature in 
the specific case of voluntary earnings announcements. I hypothesize that the key 
element that distinguishes sophisticated versus non-sophisticated investors and explains 
their different trading behavior is the capacity of the former to make their own 
assessments of fundamental firm values. Small investors, that do not have any private 
information about future earnings, will follow a simple strategy based on the available 
public information at the time of the announcement (previous forecasts by managers and 
financial analysts). However, large investors will compare their own assessment with 
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the CEOs' and the financial analysts' forecasts. And, anticipating the behavior of small 
investors, they will adopt a contrarian trading strategy. Thus, I state the first hypothesis 
as follows: 
H1: After a voluntary earnings announcement by the manager, small investors 
will follow a simple trading strategy based on publicly available information at the time 
of the announcement. Large investors will be able to anticipate the behavior of the 
small investors and will follow a contrarian trading strategy when the earnings 
announcement includes a large forecast error.  
The second strand of literature that is closely related to this research is the 
literature that analyzes the relationship between managerial incentives and disclosure 
policy. Some authors claim that managerial payment incentives can bias disclosed 
information. In particular, Aboody and Kasznik (2000) find that CEO forecasts may be 
attempted to depress stock prices just before option grants in order to take advantage of 
the lowering strike prices of the granted options. Rogers and Stocken (2005) find that 
managers might issue optimistic forecasts in an attempt to dispose of their stocks and 
options at a higher price. But other authors stress that well designed managerial 
incentives can lead to truthful revelation.  For example, unless the manager meets or 
beats forecasted earnings, his reputation might be damaged (Graham et al., 2012) or he 
may be exposed to litigation (Skinner, 1994; Kaznik and Lev, 1995) and firing risks 
(Lee et al., 2010). Almazan at al. (2008) present a model where managers, who have 
private information about the value of their firms, can use cheap talk in order to attract 
attention of analysts and/or investors who, in turn, investigate the firm, produce new 
information and correct potential undervaluation problems. These actions are credible 
because they are costly for managers - their compensation will increase if the 
announcements result in higher stock prices, but they may face a dismissal if stock 
 41 
 
prices decrease following the announcements.  In the first part of the thesis I presented 
an evidence that confirms that CEOs who receive more pay-for-performance 
compensation will be more likely to use cheap talk (such as stock splits, media coverage 
and voluntary announcements) as a means of attracting attention, but also managers are 
more likely to face dismissal or see their total pay reduced if these actions are not 
positively viewed by the market.  
My second objective in this paper is to determine whether investors take into 
account managerial incentives when they make voluntary announcements. I hypothesize 
that investors' reaction to an announcement depends on the incentives managers have 
that motivates them to make such announcements truthfully. However, as we have seen, 
there is no agreement on the literature on whether more pay-for-performance sensitivity 
is related to more or less credible announcements. So there is no clear guide to tell us 
whether investors will lend more or less credibility to managers with high pay-for-
performance sensitivities. Nevertheless, there is an agreement that short-term incentives 
are more likely to bias the information contained in voluntary announcements, while 
compensation linked to long-term performance will tend to better align the incentives of 
managers and the investors and thus makes voluntary announcements more credible. 
Therefore I present the second hypothesis as follows: 
H2: Small and large investors will take into account managerial incentives for 
disclosing truthful information in the form of voluntary earnings announcements. 
Therefore, their reaction to the announcements will be different depending on the pay-
for-performance sensitivity of the managers’ remuneration contracts. Moreover, the 
reaction may depend on the time structure of the pay contract, since short term 
incentives may undermine managerial credibility, while long term incentives may 
increase it.  
 42 
 
The third and final strand of literature related to this research is the one studying 
the relationship between managerial disclosure policy and the investor base of a firm. 
As we have seen there is ample evidence that small and large investors react differently 
to managerial announcements. These systematic differences are so informational that 
the manger may alter his disclosure policy depending on the relative importance of 
small and large investors for the company. Therefore, the frequency of voluntary 
announcements and their positive or negative bias may depend on the investor base of 
the company. Along these lines, Bushee et al. (2003) test whether managerial incentives 
for providing conference calls are related to firms' composition of investor base and find 
that the presence of non-professional small shareholders is an important factor inducing 
managers to provide open conference calls. Ajinkya et al. (2005) find that CEOs of 
firms with more institutional ownership are more likely to issue forecasts more 
frequently and convey more specific, accurate and less optimistically biased 
information.  
However, if we want to isolate the impact of the investors’ base on disclosure 
policy it is very important to control for managerial remuneration, since several papers 
show that managerial remuneration may depend on investor base. In particular some 
authors claim that the presence of small uninformed investors will lead to higher pay-
for-performance sensitivities, while others claim the opposite.  
Among the first group of researchers the idea is that the stock market plays a 
monitoring role for managerial actions through stock prices that incorporate information 
about CEO performance. Thus whatever affects prices, like investors reactions, also 
affects CEO incentives. Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) model managerial incentives as a 
function of informed trade on the firm's stock. Their main claim is that short term 
investors (liquidity traders) who buy and sell shares enhance liquidity of the stock. This 
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increased liquidity makes it easier for the informed traders to make use of their 
sophistication and benefit from making good assessments of the fundamental values of 
financial assets. Kang and Liu (2008) empirically demonstrate that informed trading 
enhances managerial pay performance sensitivities i.e. CEO compensation schemes 
work better in more informative market microstructure. Employing total compensation 
and pay performance sensitivity measures and the probability of informed trading 
(PIN), they find out a positive and significant relationship between the two. 
Among the second group of researchers the argument is that the presence of 
small investors allows managers to pay themselves higher salaries. Li and 
Subrahmanyam (2009) try to set up a link between the recent increase in pay-for-
performance executive compensations and investor clientele of firms. In particular, they 
claim that as trading costs have decreased over time (due to increased online trading, 
among others), the average degree of sophistication of the investor base has decreased 
as more small traders are attracted to take active part on the stock markets. Thus, 
managers might attempt to benefit at the expense of uninformed shareholders, who will 
find it hard to comprehend complex CEO compensation packages, especially the parts 
related to long term remuneration and retirement plans. The authors provide empirical 
evidence showing that indirect CEO compensation is positively related to small trade 
volume and negatively to institutional holdings.  
Moreover, some papers have also found a relationship between CEO pay and its 
effect on managerial disclosures. Nagar et al. (2003) argue that more frequent forecasts 
from CEOs are closely related to their equity based compensation. The extent to which 
information can be correctly interpreted by the investors and incorporated into the stock 
price through trading matters a lot to pay-performance relations and the effectiveness of 
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incentive schemes (Kang and Liu, 2008). Finally, Zamora (2009) finds that high 
compensation is associated with managers' superior forecasting abilities. 
All of this is relevant for the third hypothesis in the paper, which investigates the 
link between firms' investor base and CEOs' policies regarding voluntary earnings 
announcements. I expect that, ceteris paribus, managers facing investor base with a 
higher proportion of small investors may be more likely to make voluntary earnings 
announcements and, also, these announcements are likely to be more optimistic. 
However, we have seen that the design of CEOs' remuneration packages may depend on 
the investor base in unexpected ways. Therefore, in order to test the direct impact of the 
investor base on the managers' disclosure policies we will have to control for the 
remuneration policy. So I write the third hypothesis as follows:  
 H3: Managers compensated with a remuneration package of a given pay-for-
performance sensitivity will be more likely to make more and more optimistic voluntary 
earnings announcements when small investors have a higher share in the total trading 
volume of the firm.  
 
3.3. Data and Variables 
 
I use Thomson First Call database (Company Issued Guidelines (CIG)) to 
identify managerial voluntary disclosures for the years 2002 through 2010. In particular, 
I employ CEO annual earnings forecasts, often referred to as "earnings guidance" issued 
by firms within current fiscal year until the actual earnings are released.4 I start with 
                                                            
4 Chuk et al. (2012) assess the methods of identifying management forecasts in the First Call database as compared to a randomly 
selected sample of hand collected CEO forecasts from press releases. They find that 30% of the data is not available on CIG 
database or if they are available a big part is mistakenly reported on a date not falling within 5 day window around its true 
announcement day. This raises some concerns regarding the reliability of the database. However, the authors identify that the 
probability of the presented forecast dates to be correct increases when the forecasted item category is EPS (compared to cash, EBIT 
etc.), is for a specific dollar amount and if it is not issued together with actual earnings announcements (all of which satisfy my 
research design). Besides, the authors claim that coverage of the forecasts increases importantly after 1997 and that firms with 
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identifying annual EPS forecasts from First Call database and arrive at the final sample 
by conducting the following procedures: (i) I concentrate on firms for which 
information about executive compensation was found in EXECUCOMP database; (ii) I 
eliminate annual earnings forecasts when there are other announcements on the same 
dates. So I drop all EPS forecasts which fall within 5 trading days of actual earnings 
announcements or other firm event dates from CRSP database (like stock splits, 
dividend etc. announcements); (iii) when there are more than one EPS forecast within a 
year (for a specific year-end earnings), I take the most recent one since the closer the 
forecasted EPS is in time to the actual one, the more precise and informative it is 
believed to be (Chuk et al., 2012); (iv) erroneous or irrelevant entries (e.g. forecasts that 
date 365 days before or any day after the relevant actual year-end EPS) are dropped 
from the sample.  After applying the mentioned filters I am left with 1085 
observations.5   
3.3.1. Net Abnormal Buying  
 
 Once I have the dates of the voluntary annual EPS forecasts I need to identify 
the types of investors that trade around these announcements based on their levels of 
sophistication. To do so, I follow the established research design proposed by Lee and 
Ready (1991). By using NYSE intraday trades and quotes (TAQ) database we are able 
to identify the direction (buy or sell) of each trade on a particular stock around each 
forecast announcement window (3 days around the announcements). The typical 
procedure is as follows - there is a file of per second information on every bid and offer 
for a specific stock in a given day, there is also have a file of actual trades. The database 
does not provide direct identifiers of which trades are buys and which are sells so we 
                                                                                                                                                                              
lower analyst following and poor previous performance are less likely to be included in the database. Taking into consideration the 
abovementioned corrections and the fact that the sample covers 2002-2010 period, I feel confident with using the database. 
5Whenever a forecast is presented as a range (upper and lower values) I use a midpoint of the range as a measure of CEO EPS 
forecast.  
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need to infer the initiator of each transaction using the Lee and Ready method. A trade 
for which the stock price is lower (higher) than the midpoint of bid and ask of the 
nearest previous quote should be qualified as a sell (buy). If price is equal to the 
midpoint I compare it to the previous price and if the current price is higher (lower) 
than the previous one the trade is qualified as buy (sell); or if the transaction is still 
unqualified I repeat the same for one more lag-price. If I do not come to a conclusion 
about the direction of the trade it is qualified as unidentifiable and is not included in the 
final calculation of buys or sells (Lee and Ready, 1991; Odders-White, 2000). The 
database also gives information on the size and the volume of each trade in order to 
distinguish between large (sophisticated investors) and small (individual 
unsophisticated investors) trades. I take a cutoff threshold for each transaction with 
values up to $7,000 and assign it to the category of small size investors, $7,000 - 
$50,000 to medium size investors and above $50,000 to large investors (Bhattacharya et 
al., 2007). 6 Later, I construct abnormal trading volumes - I compare trading volumes 3 
days around forecast announcement dates to the average daily trading volumes two 
weeks before the announcements (the non-event days are also checked not to fall within 
5 days of other types of firm announcements to avoid possible biases). Finally, I 
construct the main dependent variable - Net Abnormal Buys (NAB) - as the difference in 
differences between trading volumes identified as buys and sells in announcement and 
non-announcement windows normalized by average daily total trading volume in a non 
announcement window for each stock (Bhattacharya et al., 2007). More specifically, I 
calculate Net Abnormal Buys around EPS forecasts as: 
ࡺࢇ࢈࢏,࢚ 	ൌ 		 ሾሺ࡮࢛࢟࢏,࢚	 െ ࡿࢋ࢒࢒࢏,࢚	ሻ െ ሺ࡮࢛࢟࢏,࢚ି૚	 െ ࡿࢋ࢒࢒࢏,࢚ି૚	ሻሿ/࡭࢜ࢍࢀ࢘ࢇࢊ࢏࢔ࢍࢂ࢕࢒࢚ି૚ 
                                                            
6 I also take alternative threshold of $10,000 for small investors. The results are not materially different from the reported ones. 
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 Where, Buy/Sell stands for the total daily value of transactions identified as buys 
or sells for each stock. i stands for individual stock. t is the EPS forecast announcement 
window (days [-1,0,+1], separately). (t-1) is a non-announcement window (10 trading 
days two weeks before the actual forecast date), where buys and sells as well as total 
trading volume are taken as average daily values to be comparable to the daily values 
around event dates. I calculate NABs for each investor category (small, medium, large) 
separately. 
3.3.2. EPS Forecast Errors 
 
 In order to study how managerial forecasts are analyzed by investors depending 
on their levels of sophistication I have to first set up variables measuring surprise 
elements in CEO forecasts. The literature uses the following measures to evaluate CEO 
forecasts. Actual forecast error - FE-Actual - is the difference between CEO EPS 
forecasts and the actual GAAP earnings at quarter end. News caught by forecast errors - 
FE-Analyst - is the difference between CEO EPS forecasts and mean analyst EPS 
forecasts (for the same fiscal year); In addition, I calculate the change in managerial 
sentiment about the firm - FE-Forecast - the difference between the current CEO EPS 
forecast and the one right before this announcement. I scale these differences by 
relevant stock closing prices five days before earnings forecast dates (Bhattacharya et 
al., 2007).  The positive forecast errors (FEs) convey surprise, news and/or optimism 
from managers' perspective. For example, positive FE-Analyst implies that the CEO is 
more optimistic about the coming earnings compared to the analysts and vice versa. 
Actual earnings for each year come from Compustat database as diluted fiscal year-end 
GAAP earnings excluding extraordinary items. Mean analyst forecasts come from 
I/B/E/S database. I take mean analyst forecasts that have been issued right before the 
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relevant CEO EPS forecasts to catch the more recent news conveyed in the CEO 
forecasts.  
3.3.3. CEO Compensation 
 
Data on CEO compensation comes from EXECUCOMP. I construct 
Compensation Delta measuring the sensitivity of CEO's portfolio of stocks and options 
to the underlying stock prices. In particular, delta measures dollar change of the value of 
a portfolio of financial assets for 1% change in the stock price. The measure is 
extensively used in managerial compensation literature and is calculated as a partial 
derivative of the Black and Scholes (1973) formula for option valuation with respect to 
stock price. I follow Core and Guay (2002) method for calculating the variable. 
Compensation deltas cover all firm related assets in managerial portfolios - current 
options and stock grants, previously granted exercisable and un-exercisable options 
together with previously granted vested and unvested stocks. Thus, it captures the total 
CEO wealth exposure to stock prices.  
For the main analyses I closely follow the empirical design proposed in 
Bhattacharya et al. (2007) and include daily total market trading volume on 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ (normalized by the traded number of shares) in all event days 
to capture the influence of prevailing general macroeconomic factors. In addition, I 
consider other firm specific characteristics as controls such as firm size (total assets), 
market-to-book ratio, leverage (total debt to equity), stock  returns (annual percent price 
changes) and stock return volatilities (standard deviation of monthly returns in the past 
60 months). Data comes from Compustat and CRSP. 
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3.3.4. Basic Descriptives 
 
Table 9 shows the distribution of trade sizes (as a share in total trade volumes) in 
the three trading days around forecast dates among three investor categories (small, 
medium, large) and across years. As we can see, on average trades are equally 
distributed across investor categories (each of them occupy around one third of the total 
- presented at the bottom of the table) but it is also worthwhile to mention that small 
trades constituted a smaller part of the whole trading volume at the beginning of the 
sample period (in 2002 they represented only 15 % compared to 47% of large trades) 
and increased by more than three times by the end of 2010, mostly at the expense of 
decreasing large trade sizes. One of the explanations of this tendency could be related to 
the issuance of a new regulatory rule - Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) by the US 
SEC at the end of 2000. This rule forced the companies to refrain from selective 
disclosures to only large investors and analysts. The new rule required the placement of 
the most important company announcements in press releases. Thus firm related 
information started to be widely available for small audiences from the beginning of 
2001 and it must have increased more and more with the passage of time. Also, as 
trading costs decreased over time (due, to a large extent, to increased online trading), 
the participation rates of small investors increased (Li and Subrahmanyam, 2009). Table 
9 shows more detailed information about trade sizes. In particular we can explore trade 
categories (buys vs. sells) across all investor sizes. On average, buys seem to be 
marginally more prevalent than sells for all investors around forecast announcements 
and buys decreased more than sells for large investors across years. 
[Insert Table 9 about Here] 
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Panel A of Figure 6 shows the behavior of 3 day cumulative NABs around 
forecast dates across investor categories in the whole sample and in two different 
periods 2002-2005 and 2006-2010 (roughly before and after the financial crisis). Small 
NABs seem to be steadier in all periods whereas large NABs (and partly medium ones 
as well) show a radically different behavior in the two sample periods - large investors 
seem to be buying abnormally high in 2002-2005 and much less in 2006-2010. Once we 
take a closer look at daily NABs on Panel B which covers the whole sample period, we 
discover that, on average, net buying activities have been concentrated mostly on days 0 
and 1 for all investors. Large investors seem to be net sellers on day -1.  
[Insert Figure 6 about Here] 
 We can see the evolution of the forecast errors over the years in Table 10. If we 
look at the differences in CEO forecasts relative to mean analyst forecasts  - FE-Analyst 
- we can see that CEOs have been forecasting earnings that are very close to the mean 
analyst values with marginally more pessimistic/prudent numbers (negative FE Analyst 
indicates that, on average, CEO forecasts have been lower than analysts'). The 
difference between CEO forecasts and actual year-end EPS numbers - FE-Actual – 
imply that CEOs tend to be optimistic. This difference may also be due to the 
discrepancy between what CEOs include in their calculations of forecasted EPS's and 
the GAAP requirements for actual EPS calculations at the end of fiscal year. FE-
Forecast shows that the magnitude by which the current CEO EPS forecasts differ from 
the previous ones (for the same actual year end EPS) is almost always negative 
indicating that, the closer the CEOs get to the actual EPS announcement dates, the more 
conservative they tend to become in forecasting EPS numbers. 
[Insert Table 10 about Here] 
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 Detailed descriptive statistics of all variables are provided in Table 11. 
Compensation delta is represented in thousands of dollars and short term incentives as a 
ratio (of vested stocks and exercisable options over total annual compensation). To 
exclude outliers I filter the data for positive leverage and market-to-book ratios. I also 
censor the sample from observations for which CEO forecasts are 10 times or more 
lower or higher than the corresponding EPS metrics to avoid extreme errors. 
[Insert Table 11 about Here] 
  
3.4. Research Design and Results 
 
3.4.1. Forecast Errors and Investor Reaction 
 
 I employ the following pooled OLS regressions to test Hypotheses 1 and 2, i.e. 
whether large and small investors react differently to the announcements and whether 
these reactions take into account CEO incentives. In particular I estimate: 
										ࡺࢇ࢈࢏,࢚ 	ൌ 		ࢇ ൅ ࢼ૚ ∗ ࡲࡱቊ ࡭࢔ࢇ࢒࢙࢚࢟࡭ࢉ࢚࢛ࢇ࢒ࡲ࢕࢘ࢋࢉࢇ࢙࢚ቋ࢏,࢚		
൅ ࢼ૛ ∗ ࡯࢕࢓࢖࢏,࢚	 ൅ 	ࢼ૜ ∗ ࡲࡱቊ ࡭࢔ࢇ࢒࢙࢚࢟࡭ࢉ࢚࢛ࢇ࢒ࡲ࢕࢘ࢋࢉࢇ࢙࢚ቋ࢏,࢚	
∗
																																																				࡯࢕࢓࢖࢏,࢚	 ൅ 					∑ࢼ࢐ ∗ ࢄ࢏,࢚ ൅ 	ࢿ࢏,࢚                                              (8)  
 In this equation NAB stands for Net Abnormal Buys, FE-Actual stands for the 
difference between CEO forecasts and actual earnings at year end, FE-Analyst - for the 
difference between CEO and analyst forecasts and FE-Forecast for the difference 
between the current CEO forecast and the previous EPS forecast values. COMP is CEO 
compensation delta and X - the vector of other controls, i stands for specific firm and t 
for time. All regressions include industry and year dummies. I run these regressions for 
all three types of investors (small, medium, large) separately. 
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 With regard to the first hypothesis, by assumption, unsophisticated investors 
cannot filter supplied information; therefore, if they react to the announcements, I 
expect them to follow an automatic strategy of buying (selling) in response to good 
(bad) news. Therefore, I expect to see higher and more significant net abnormal buying 
reactions when CEOs make more positive announcements, i.e. small net buys will be 
positively correlated to the forecast errors. On the contrary, sophisticated investors can 
scrutinize supplied information and detect optimistic biases, so their reaction to forecast 
errors should be less NABs (less buys or more sells) than those of the uninformed ones; 
thus, I expect a positive and higher ߚଵ_small in comparison to ߚଵ_large, in which the 
latter can be negative or insignificant. 
Additionally, the second hypothesis is that investors will take into account CEO 
incentives when they observe a voluntary announcement, but I do not have an a-priory 
expectation of whether higher pay-for-performance will make the CEO more or less 
credible. I only expect significant an opposite values of ߚଷ_small and ߚଷ_large. 
Medium investors are generally associated with large and sophisticated traders, 
so I expect them to show similar trading patterns as the large ones. Nevertheless, the 
threshold between small and medium investors is arbitrary and mixed results are 
expected. 
 The primary results are presented in Table 12a. Each column corresponds to the 
indicated investor group. As we can see, the relationship between the buying behaviors 
across different investor categories and forecast errors is in line with the expectations. In 
particular, the higher the CEO forecasts relative to the analysts' and the previous CEO 
forecasts (i.e. the manager has become more optimistic about the future of the firm), the 
more will small unsophisticated investors buy around the announcement window. It is 
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worth emphasizing that such result only appears in models 1 and 3 but not in model 2. 
This result is consistent with the fact that small investors are not able to make their own 
forecasts. They only take actions based on the provided CEO forecasts and other 
information publicly available at the time of the announcement (i.e. financial analysts 
forecasts in model 1 and previous CEO forecasts in model 3).  
 For large investors, the result is the opposite; they adopt a contrarian trading 
strategy to CEO forecasts in model 2 which compares their assessment of fundamental 
values of financial assets with the announcement of the manager. Large investors seem 
to make a good job at detecting overly optimistic announcements and following a 
contrarian strategy to take advantage of the small investors' positive reaction to good 
news. This set of results confirms to the first part of Hypothesis 1 and is also partly in 
line with the findings of Bhattacharya et al. (2007) - the closest reference to this study. 
The authors look at the trading behavior of investors around pro-forma earnings 
announcements and find a significant positive net buying of small investors on analyst 
forecast errors (difference between pro-forma and analyst EPSs), though they receive 
insignificant results about the trading behavior of large investors. Overall, their results 
suggest that market reaction is almost exclusively attributable to less sophisticated 
investors and large investors mainly refrain themselves from buying.   
3.4.2. Forecast Errors, Investor Reaction and Managerial Incentives 
 
In order to check whether investors analyze CEO incentives and their effect on 
the credibility of voluntary announcements, we have to look at the interaction terms 
between the forecast errors and CEO compensation. Here we see that for small 
investors, as well as for large ones, higher managerial incentives (high pay-for-
performance compensation) tend to moderate their initial reactions to the 
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announcements. This confirms hypothesis 2, indicating that investors internalize the 
information portrayed in executive compensation and smooth out their initial 
buying/selling decisions following CEO forecasts.  
In the case of small investors CEOs with high pay-for-performance sensitivities 
are less credible. Small investors, which tend to buy on forecast errors, buy less when 
optimistic announcements are made by CEOs with high pay-for-performance 
compensation. Thus we can say that although small investors lack information they are 
not naïve, they understand that CEOs may have incentives to make announcements that 
increase the value of their compensation package and, therefore, lend less credibility to 
managers with more pay-for-performance sensitivity. 
The behavior of large investors is more difficult to analyze. They are less likely 
to sell when they observe optimistic announcements from CEOs with high pay-for-
performance sensitivities. This can be interpreted as a sign that they think that high pay-
for-performance incentives aligns managers' interests with investors' and makes CEOs 
more credible. But, since large investors are using a contrarian strategy, it could also 
indicate that they are simply anticipating a less sanguine reaction from the small 
investors when an optimistic announcement is being made by a CEO whose 
remuneration package contains lots of stocks and options.  
[Insert Table 12a about Here] 
In order to shed more light on this issue, I repeat the previous analysis by 
distinguishing between the short-term and the long-term incentives of the managers. So 
far the analysis has used all stocks and options at CEOs' disposal as proxy for 
managerial incentives. Now I take only the part of stocks and options in executives' 
portfolios that have been vested and are exercisable (standardized by total direct current 
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compensation) to proxy for short-term incentives. These assets constitute to only the 
part of managerial stock and option portfolio that can be disposed of at any moment at 
present. The intuition is that CEOs with more short-term incentives might be focused on 
more short-term results and thus be more likely to mislead investors (Aboody and 
Kasznik, 2000; Rogers and Stocken, 2005). 
 The results of this analysis are displayed in Table 12b. The variables of interest 
are the interaction terms between CEO compensation and the size of forecast errors. 
Large investors are more likely to sell when they observe an optimistic announcement 
by the CEO with high short-term pay-for-performance sensitivity, while small investors 
do not seem to react to the term structure of the compensation. In this sense, there is an 
extra element of sophistication ascribed to large investors, since only they can 
distinguish between the different incentives provided by short-term and long-term 
oriented compensation packages. 
[Insert Table 12b about Here] 
3.4.3. Forecast Error Size and Firm Investor Base 
 
Finally, I test hypothesis 3 on whether CEOs adjust their disclosure policy to the 
characteristics of the investor base. The underlying assumption is that CEOs are 
informed agents and they know ex ante the types of investors who are going to trade 
once they issue forecasts. The first test of the hypothesis looks at whether the size of 
CEO forecast errors depends on firms' investor base. More specifically, I am going to 
estimate the following OLS regressions:  
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ቋ
࢏,࢚	
	ൌ ࢻ ൅ ࢼ૚ ∗ ࢀ࢘ࢇࢊࢋ_ࡿ࢏ࢠࢋቊ ࡿ࢓ࢇ࢒࢒ࡹࢋࢊ࢏࢛࢓ࡸࢇࢍࢋ ቋ࢏,࢚	
൅ ࢼ૛ ∗ ࡯࢕࢓࢖࢏,࢚	 ൅ 		ࢼ૜
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∗ 			࡯࢕࢓࢖࢏,࢚	 ൅ 	∑ࢼ࢐ ∗ ࢄ࢏,࢚ ൅ 	ࢿ࢏,࢚								ሺ9ሻ 
            Where, the left hand side of the equation stands for the indicated forecast errors 
i.e. how much manager's announced forecasts differ from other EPSs (Analyst, Actual, 
and Forecast (t-1)). Trade-Size is the explanatory variable which measures the 
proportion of different trade sizes in the total trading volume (i.e. Small-Trades/Total-
Trade-Volume) for each investor category around the announcement dates; COMP 
stands for CEO compensation delta; and X are other firm specific controls. i stands for a 
specific firm and t for time. The regression includes industry and year dummies. The 
regression is estimated for three different types of investors - Small, Med and Large and 
three measures of EPS forecast errors separately. 
The results of the estimation are provided in Table 13. We find a weak evidence 
of the link between the size of forecast errors and firm investor base. Only according to 
model 3 the higher the share of small investors, the higher the error in CEO's forecasted 
EPS. Conversely, having more trades initiated from large investors is associated with 
lower errors in CEO's announced forecasts (Models 1 and 3). Thus, I argue that CEOs 
act differently considering the characteristics of the investor base. They internalize the 
pressure from sophisticated (large) investors and avoid strategic (contrarian) behavior 
related to forecast errors. When we look at the interaction term of CEO incentives and 
large trade sizes we see a positive coefficient, implying that CEO incentives affect 
positively the size of issued forecasts when they are addressing to large investors, 
supposedly on an assumption that the announcements will be accepted as more credible.  
[Insert Table 13 about Here] 
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3.4.4. Probability of Forecasts and Firm Investor Base 
 
Hypothesis 3 also states that the probability that a CEO makes a voluntary 
announcement at all also depends on the investor base. To test this we have to identify 
matching non-forecasting pairs for each of the forecasting firms. The matching is done 
based on 4-digit industry and the size of firms' total assets (I pick out the closest match 
in size within 4 digit industry among the non-forecasting firms). I was able to get 
information on 315 pairs (i.e. sample of 630 firms) for the 2004-2010 period. In order to 
explore the differences between the treatment (announcing) and matched firms I first 
conduct a test of mean differences. Table 14 shows that the matched firms are not 
statistically different from the treatment group in terms of returns, leverage, market-to-
book, total assets, return or return volatility. Remarkably, forecasting firms show much 
higher and significant net abnormal buying behavior compared to the matched ones in 
all investor categories. Around announcement days, the trading volumes coming from 
large investors are higher for forecasting firms in comparison to the matched ones, 
whereas small investors seem to be represented by slightly less trading. When we look 
at the non-event period, however, we do not see any statistically different behavior of 
different investors of announcing and non-announcing firms.  
[Insert Table 14 About Here] 
 Now I can test the other part of Hypothesis 3 by estimating the probability of 
EPS forecast contingent on firms' investor base two weeks before announcements. To 
estimate the probability of EPS forecast I estimate the following logistic regression: 
	ࡲ࢕࢘ࢋࢉࢇ࢙࢚࢙࢏,࢚ 	ൌ 		ࢇ ൅	ࢼ૚ ∗ ࢀ࢘ࢇࢊࢋ_ࡿ࢏ࢠࢋቊ ࡿ࢓ࢇ࢒࢒ࡹࢋࢊ࢏࢛࢓ࡸࢇࢍࢋ ቋ࢏,࢚ି૚	
൅ 			∑	ࢼ࢐ࢄ࢏,࢚	 ൅ 	ࢿ࢏,࢚				       (10) 
Where, 
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ࡼ࢘ሺࡲ࢕࢘ࢋࢉࢇ࢙࢚࢙࢏,࢚ 	ൌ ૚ห	ࢄ૚,࢚ି૚	, ࢄ૛,࢚	 …ࢄ࢑,࢚	൯ ൌ 	 ૚૚ ൅	܍ିሺ܉ା∑઺ܒ∗܆ܑሻ 
 Where, the left hand side of the equation is a dummy variable stating the 
probability of forecasts (the firm issues a forecast) taking value of 1 conditionally on Xs 
(firm specific control variables, including industry and year dummies). Trade-Size 
stands for the average proportion of different investors in total trading volume 
throughout 10 trading days two weeks before forecast announcement days; i stands for a 
specific firm, t for event window and (t-1) for the non-event window. I estimate the 
regression for different types of investors - Small, Med and Large - separately. The 
coefficient of interest is ߚଵ. A positive value for this coefficient implies that the 
probability that the CEO issues a voluntary EPS forecast increases with the proportion 
of trade share of the corresponding investor category. 
 The results of the estimation are provided in Table 15. They indicate that the 
larger the share of small investors in the total trading volume, the larger the probability 
of the CEOs issuing voluntary EPS forecast. However, the significance level of the 
coefficient is marginal at 10% confidence level. 
[Insert Table 15 about Here] 
 
3.5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
Management voluntary earnings announcements are targeted at all investors on 
the market. However, the skills for evaluating the information supplied by the CEO 
through these announcements might vary greatly across interested parties. Large 
institutional buyers possess greater abilities and means in terms of experience, financial 
education or access to research tools compared to small individual investors. Moreover, 
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large and small investors may differ in their ability to “second guess” the CEO's 
intentions when making these voluntary announcements, since CEOs that get rewarded 
when market prices are high may have incentives to report too optimistic earnings 
forecasts.  
In this paper I study the complex relationship between voluntary earning 
announcements, CEO compensation and investors' reaction to these announcements. 
The initial hypothesis that I test is that small and large investors will react differently to 
the voluntary announcements depending on their information sets and their different 
level of analysis of managerial incentives. Moreover, anticipating the different behavior 
of small and large investors to voluntary earnings announcements, managers will 
choose different disclosure policies depending on their investor base.  
The results show that small and large investors react differently to voluntary 
earnings announcements. Small investors always buy after positive announcements 
(when the new forecast is more optimistic than the previous forecasts by analysts and 
the managers themselves). However, only large investors have skills of computing their 
own estimations of actual earnings and follow a contrarian strategy when they see 
overly optimistic announcements. They sell when CEOs make large forecasting errors, 
and take advantage of the anticipated behavior of small investors.  
The results also indicate that small investors react less to managerial 
announcements when the CEO compensation packages have higher-pay-for-
performance sensitivity, which could give them the incentives to manipulate market 
prices. Small investors find CEOs with high pay-for-performance compensation 
packages less credible, thus they are not naive while making trading decisions. On the 
other hand, large investors look at CEO incentives as the means of aligning manager's 
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and investors' interests, which makes the announcements more credible to them. In 
addition, large investors are even more sophisticated in the way that they can 
distinguish between short-term and long-term CEO incentives and find CEOs, whose 
compensation packages have higher proportions of vested stocks and exercisable stock 
options disposable at present, less credible.  
Finally, I also find that, anticipating this different behavior of large and small 
investors, CEOs take into account investor base of their firms when designing 
disclosure policy. Voluntary earnings announcements are more likely and more 
optimistic in companies with a larger share of small investors.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Who Trades Around Stock Splits? 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
 Stock splits are long observed phenomena in equity markets with the first 
recorded one dating back to at least 17th century in the East India Company. Even 
though numerous studies have been done since then to understand the event, it still stays 
a controversial puzzle. Theoretically stock splits correspond to slicing a pie into thinner 
pieces and thus should not be associated with the change in the value of firm's equity. 
Therefore, stock splits are considered cosmetic measures that only increase the number 
of shares outstanding and do not affect the generation of cash flows by the company. 
However, several empirical findings show that market reacts favorably to split 
announcements. 
 Two most widely accepted explanations of splits have been proposed in the past. 
One is the trading range hypothesis, implying that there exists an optimal range of 
market prices that are more appealing to investors and, thus, managers strive to get 
stock prices within this range in order to improve stock liquidity. Even though this 
assumption is partly in conflict with increased transaction costs associated with smaller 
share prices, statistics show that despite inflation the average nominal share prices have 
been constant during the past half century in almost all capital markets around the 
world. The optimal trading range hypothesis is strongly supported by several empirical 
research (Lakonishok and Lev, 1987; Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1996; Conroy and 
Harris, 1999; Anshuman and Kalay, 2002; Dyl and Elliott, 2006; Baker et al., 2009). In 
addition, as a survey revealed, executives name trading range hypothesis as the main 
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motivation for splitting stocks (Baker and Gallagher, 1980). However, there is another 
strand of literature that challenges the hypothesis by showing that liquidity decreases 
after stock splits. In particular, Copeland (1979), Conroy et al. (1990), Gray et al. 
(2003) and Kadapakkam et al. (2005) find that bid-ask spreads increase after stock splits 
and Copeland (1979) documents that trading volumes decrease after the event.  
 The other motivation for splitting stocks is signaling i.e. when the management 
is confident that earnings will continue growing, pushing prices further up, they are 
more willing to split stocks to attract investors' attention. However, when tested, this 
hypothesis resulted in mixed findings as well. On the one hand, the discovery that 
favorable abnormal market reactions take place around splits serves as an evidence of 
positive investor sentiment towards stock splits (Fama et al., 1969; Grinblatt et al., 
1984; Lakonishok and Lev, 1987; Brennan and Copeland, 1988; Asquith et al., 1989; 
Brennan and Hughes, 1990; McNichols and Dravid, 1990; Ikenberry et al., 1996; Desai 
and Jain, 1997; Conroy and Harris, 1999). On the other hand, when examined in the 
long run, the performance of splitting firms showed no significant difference from their 
counterparts (Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1996; Byun and Rozeff, 2003; Huang et al., 
2006). 
 Decrease in informational asymmetries between managers and shareholders 
following stock splits is considered a complement to signaling hypothesis; increase in 
analyst following (Brennan and Hughes, 1991) and change in analyst earnings forecasts 
after splits (McNichols and Dravid, 1990; Conroy and Harris, 1999) contribute to the 
signaling role of the announcements. 
 In this study I further examine the signaling role of stock splits by exploring 
whether the informational value of splits is contingent on the type of investors. My 
expectation is that if stock splits act as signals of future superior performance of the 
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announcing firms, large informed investors should take advantage of this information 
and trade around announcements.  
 The preference of managers to maintain stock prices low is connected to the 
specific investor base that they wish to attract. Managerial surveys show that low stock 
prices attract small investors (Baker and Gallagher, 1980). The main reason for this 
preference is often proposed to be increased liquidity - enlarging investor base by 
allowing small investors to trade. Previous studies that tried to distinguish between 
trading behaviors of small and large investors around stock splits have found mixed 
results. Some researchers provide evidence of increasing investor base after stock splits 
at the expense of institutional owners (Maloney and Mulherin, 1992; Powell and Baker, 
1993). In this line, other studies showed that stock splits attract small uninformed 
traders (Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1996; Stulz, 2000; Kryzanowski and Zhang, 1996; 
Easley et al., 2001; Kadapakkam et al., 2005; Dyl and Elliott, 2006). However, other 
studies, using the fact that short interest/short selling is often associated with traders' 
sophistication skills, show that there is no change in short interest after splits contrary to 
signaling hypothesis (Kadiyala and Vetsuypens, 2002). This latter result has been 
questioned recently by Perez and Tang (2012) who show that short interest permanently 
declines after splits. 
 Most of the studies in search of identifying small vs. large traders' activities 
around splits focus on testing the trading range hypothesis i.e. whether new lower prices 
after the splits actually promote small traders' activities. Even though the previously 
discussed two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, it is very difficult to disentangle 
the effects of the two. In this paper, I try to separate the two hypotheses by focusing on 
the reaction of different investors at the moment of announcement (not when the splits 
are realized). In this way, it is possible to partly abstract from the influence of optimal 
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trading range hypothesis, the effect of which should be more visible at the moment of 
stock split realization (actual splits usually happen 2 months after the announcements). 
 This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews existing literature on 
stock splits. Section 3 discusses data and methodologies for testing the hypotheses. 
Section 4 provides results and Section 5 concludes the findings. 
 
4.2. Related Literature and Contribution 
 
 There is no consensus either in theory or empirics on the reasons and/or 
incentives behind stock splits. However, two dominant theories have been proposed by 
academics and practitioners both of which have been tested empirically many times 
with no unanimous results. The first, trading range hypothesis implies that there exists 
an optimal range of stock prices which is more appealing to investors and thus 
managers strive to get firm’s stock prices within this range to improve stock liquidity. 
The second, signaling hypothesis assumes that when managers are confident that 
earnings will continue growing, pushing prices further up, they are more willing to split 
stocks and attract investors’ attention. 
 There is a large empirical literature on the favorable market reaction to stock 
split announcements. Fama et al. (1969) show evidence that market interprets split 
announcements as a sign of expected dividend increases. Grinblatt et al. (1984) show 
that stock splits and stock dividend announcements are usually followed by favorable 
changes in stock returns. Lakonishok and Lev (1987) find 3 to 4% positive abnormal 
returns around stock split announcements implying improved performance prospects. 
Asquith, Healy and Palepu (1989) propose that stock split announcements are 
interpreted by investors as the increased probability of future earnings. Ikenberry et al. 
(1996) find that stock split announcements have indeed a favorable effect on returns but 
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only if the firm is undervalued and needs analyst attention to increase stock value. The 
valuation effect of splits is even higher when they look in the long run (one to three year 
periods).  Desai and Jain (1997) check the long term abnormal returns surrounding 
stock splits and find evidence of 7% and 12% growth in 1 and 3 years, respectively.  
 These results have been explained in two different ways: 
 (i) Trading range hypothesis. Some authors argue that there is an optimal price 
range for a stock and splits is a mechanism to bring prices to such a range so to 
"broaden" the market for these securities. Baker and Gallagher (1980), who surveyed 
corporate managers, report that 94% of the interviewees indicated moving share prices 
into an "optimal trading range” as their major motivation for splitting stocks. 
Lakonishok and Lev (1987) study the characteristics of stock prices by following the 
firms years before and after splits and find evidence confirming the trading range 
hypothesis. Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1996) check market behavior around ADR 
split announcements. The authors contrast the signaling hypothesis by comparing the 
liquidity changes after sponsored and unsponsored ADR stock splits (no signaling is 
involved in the latter type of ADRs thus they serve as a control group). They find that 
daily transactions of small and medium traders increase after splits independently of the 
type of ADR, thus, supporting liquidity (trading range hypothesis) incentives for stock 
splits. Conroy and Harris (1999) claim that there is a liquidity argument behind splitting 
stocks, which is to move the prices down to a reasonable trading range. Anshuman and 
Kalay (2002) propose a model and show that there exists an optimal price for a stock 
under certain parametric values. Baker et al. (2009) provide strong evidence that when 
investors place high valuation on low-price stocks, managers respond by supplying 
shares at demanded low prices.  Finally, Dyl and Elliott (2006) research whether firms 
select a specific trading range for their stock based on the size of investors and by 
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computing the propensity to split, the authors show that firms whose share prices are 
above their predicted trading range (computed based on the assumption that firms 
owned by small investors prefer low prices) are more likely to split stocks in the coming 
4 years. 
(ii) Signaling hypothesis. Some authors argue that the main role of stock splits is 
to convey positive information to the market and it will be credible, because splits are 
costly. For example, Brennan and Copeland (1998) show that splits are credible signals 
because of the increased transaction costs involved in trading for lower-priced stocks 
and Conroy et al. (1990) refer to the increased liquidity costs (higher bid-ask spreads) 
following stock splits (in addition to other administrative monetary costs associated 
with splitting stocks (McGough, 1993)). Ikenberry et al. (1996) support the signaling 
value of splits by showing abnormal returns around the announcements. Brennan and 
Hughes (1990) present a model that explains the informational content of stock splits 
given that only managers with good earnings forecasts address to stock splits. They 
argue that stock splits will be considered a credible way of attracting attention of 
financial analysts working for brokerage houses because commissions are decreasing in 
stock prices. Thus, such analysts will be more interested in firms’ economic situation 
and only the companies that have good information to convey to the market will be 
willing to split stocks. McNichols and Dravid (1990) proxy managers' private 
information on earnings by analysts' forecast errors. These authors analyze the 
connection between the size of the split and the forecast errors before and after split. 
They find a positive relationship between the two and interpret it as a proof of signaling 
value of stock splits. In this line, Brennan and Hughes (1991) propose that stock splits 
serve as signals to attract analysts' attention and document that the number of analyst 
following a firm is positively related to the split size. Conroy and Harris (1999) address 
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the informational content of stock split announcements as well. They find that larger 
split factors lead to superior analyst earnings forecasts, which according to them is a 
direct confirmation of informational context of stock split announcements.  
 (iii) Counterfactual hypotheses.  
 On the trading range hypothesis; There is another strand of literature claiming 
that stock splits actually decrease liquidity rather than increase as the trading range 
hypothesis states. Copeland (1979), Conroy et al. (1990), Gray et al. (2003) and 
Kadapakkam et al. (2005) find that bid-ask spreads increase and Copeland (1979) finds 
that trading volumes decrease after stock splits.  
 On the signaling hypothesis; There is evidence that splitting firms do not show 
abnormal returns in the long run implying that signaling might not be a valid hypothesis 
(Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1996; Byun and Rozeff, 2003; Huang et al., 2006). 
 Taking into account the previous non-conclusive evidence, in this paper I 
advance in the analysis of the informational content of stock splits by separating 
investors’ reaction according to their levels of sophistication: large versus small. The 
objective is, thus, to conduct a test of the signaling value of stock splits contingent on 
the types of investors. I expect to see higher abnormal buying initiated from large 
investors around stock splits if they serve as credible signals of future firm performance. 
 On the intensive trading activity of small investors around stock splits. The 
clientele effect following stock splits suggests that executives are more targeted at small 
shareholders when making the decision to split (Baker and Gallagher, 1980). If the 
reduction in prices allows small investors to trade, then such investors should show a 
larger reaction to stock splits. Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1996) show that frequency 
and volume of small trades increase after stock splits. Stulz (2000) checks buy orders 
initiated from small investors in different periods around stock splits and finds that 
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number of small trades is significantly high following stock splits and stays high after 3 
months of the announcements. Using intraday trade data Kryzanowski and Zhang 
(1996) investigate the trading behavior of small and large investors around stock split ex 
dates and find that trading volumes coming from small (large) traders increases 
(decreases) following splits and the direction of trades changes (does not change) from 
sell to buy. Easley, O'Hara and Saar (2001) also employ intraday trade data and, by 
using the probability of informed trading (PIN), find that stock splits attract small 
(uninformed) traders. Kadapakkam et al. (2005) find the evidence of increased number 
of small trades after splits (the frequency of individual trades almost doubles). 
 On the intensity trading activity of large investors around stock splits. Maloney 
and Mulherin (1992) show that number of shareholders increase after stock splits and in 
particular, the percentage of institutional shareholders increases between the two fiscal 
years before and after splits. The increase in shareholder base is associated mainly with 
the ease of diversifying portfolios without completely divesting from the firm (small 
shareholders can sell part of their split shares). These new shares are soaked up by 
institutional investors whose interest has grown with the increase in the value of the 
firm after stock splits.  
 Taking into consideration the previous set of results I want to re-examine the 
trading reactions of different investors (sophisticated versus non sophisticated), but 
NOT when stock splits are realized, which is where the majority of the studies focus on, 
but when they are announced. This will allow me to analyze the informational content 
of stock splits contingent on the type of investors. 
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4.3. Data and Variables 
 
I identify all stock splits from CRSP database with event distribution code 5523. 
The period covered is 1993-2011. The goal - to concentrate more on signaling role of 
splits - justifies the choice of announcement days rather than actual split or ex-date 
events. Announcements usually happen 2 months before the actual splits take place, in 
this way I am partly abstracting from the effects of the previously proposed trading 
range hypothesis i.e. increased liquidity due to the fact that smaller share prices allow 
small investors more flexibility to trade right after actual splits but not around simple 
announcements. 
 In order to get the final sample I eliminate any other firm related announcements 
(often mandatory) around the same days as split announcements not to bias the results. 
So I drop all stock splits that fall within 5 trading days of other significant firm events 
(like earnings, dividend and other recorded announcements on CRSP database).  I end 
up with 790 splits of 618 firms with split size greater or equal to 0.25. 
4.3.1. Net Abnormal Buying 
 
 After getting announcement dates of stock splits we need to identify types of 
investors trading around these announcements based on their levels of sophistication. 
To do so, I follow the similar strategy established in our previous paper following the 
Lee and Ready (1991) method. I use NYSE intraday trades and quotes (TAQ) database 
to identify the direction (buy or sell) of each trade on a particular stock around each 
announcement window (3 days around the announcements). First, I conduct a quote 
test: I compare trade price to the midpoint of Bid and Ask of the immediate previous 
quote and if the price is lower (higher) than the midpoint, I qualify the trade as seller 
(buyer) initiated. If the two numbers are equal I use the tick test, where trade price is 
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compared to the previous price, if the current price is lower (higher) than the previous 
one, the trade is qualified as seller (buyer) initiated and/or the procedure goes on back to 
one more lag. If the transaction is still unqualified I leave it out from the future 
calculations of buys and sells (Lee and Ready, 1991; Odders-White, 2000). The 
database also gives us information on the size and the volume of each trade in order to 
distinguish between large (sophisticated) and small (individual unsophisticated) traders. 
I take a cutoff threshold for each transaction with values up to $7,000 and assign it to 
the category of small size investors, $7,000-$50,000 to medium size investors and 
above $50,000 to large investors (Bhattacharya et al., 2007).7 Later, I construct 
abnormal trading volumes - I compare trading volumes in 3 days around split 
announcement dates to the average daily trading volumes two weeks before the 
announcements (the non-event days are also checked not to fall within 5 days of other 
types of firm announcements to avoid possible biases). Finally, I construct the main 
dependent variable - Net Abnormal Buys (NABs) - as the difference in differences 
between buys and sells in announcement and non-announcement windows normalized 
by average daily non-announcement total trading volume for each stock (Bhattacharya 
et al., 2007). I calculate Net Abnormal Buys around split announcements as: 
ࡺࢇ࢈࢏,࢚ 	ൌ 		 ሾሺ࡮࢛࢟࢏,࢚	 െ ࡿࢋ࢒࢒࢏,࢚	ሻ െ ሺ࡮࢛࢟࢏,࢚ି૚	 െ ࡿࢋ࢒࢒࢏,࢚ି૚	ሻሿ/࡭࢜ࢍࢀ࢘ࢇࢊ࢏࢔ࢍࢂ࢕࢒࢚ି૚ 
 
 Where, Buy/Sell stands for the total daily value of transactions identified as buys 
or sells for each stock. i stands for individual stock. t is the stock split announcement 
window (days [-1,0,+1]). (t-1) is a non-announcement window (10 trading days two 
weeks before the announcement day), where buys and sells as well as total trading 
volume is taken as average daily values to be comparable to the daily values around 
                                                            
7 I also take alternative threshold of $10,000 for small investors. The results are not materially different from the reported ones. 
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event dates. I calculate NABs for each investor category (small, medium, large) 
separately. 
 Statistical features of Net Abnormal Buys are presented in Table 16. Average 
NAB is 0.019 for small and 0.003 for large investors. At one glance this indicates that, 
on average, small investors are more net buyers than large ones around stock split 
announcements. Medium investors show the highest net buying activities, though it is 
difficult to qualify which types of investors belong to this category. Some studies 
propose that medium sized trades might belong to large investors who purposely split 
up their transactions in smaller pieces for several reasons (Bhattacharya et al., 2007). 
However, we cannot be sure of that and especially cannot confidently draw conclusions. 
Also, Table 16 shows that there are much less splits in the later periods of the sample 
rather than at the beginning (either due to the financial crises or decreased popularity of 
splits - see Minnick and Raman (2013) for detailed review of the reasons behind 
declining splits). Also, average small NABs become more negative for small investors 
after 2003 (before this date they were always positive). Large NABs show very mixed 
results, they are negative almost half of the time, on average, while medium NABs are 
always positive throughout the whole sample. 
[Insert Table 16 about Here] 
 The per day (-1;0;+1) split up of Net Abnormal Buys look as follows (Figure 7): 
Day 0 marks positive net buying activities for all categories of investors. Day 1 is 
positive only for small and medium investors. 
[Insert Figure 7 about Here]  
 As frequently mentioned in the previous literature on signaling role of splits, 
manager's choice of split factors (size) reflects his private information about the future 
performance of the firm, thus I distinguish NABs between different split sizes (split 
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factor). The hypothesis states that the higher the splitting factor (i.e. the more shares 
investors are going to get in exchange for the existing ones) the higher the signaling 
value of splits (McNichols and Dravid, 1990; Brennan and Hughes, 1991; Conroy and 
Harris, 1999). Figure 8 shows that small and medium investors are net abnormal buyers 
to all sizes of split factors, whereas large investors are net buyers only to the split 
factors higher than 1 (two for one splits). By looking at the numbers we can say that 
large investors are only responsive as buyers to the more "informative" splits. 
[Insert Figure 8 about Here] 
 Concerning the intensity of trading around stock splits we look at the proportion 
of trading volumes (as well as buys and sells separately) of each investor category in the 
total trading volume (see Table 17). On average, the proportion of small investors is the 
smallest and constitutes only 6.5 % of the total trading compared to the 58.8 % 
representation of large ones in the total trading. However, we can notice gradual 
increase (decrease) in the participation rates of small (large) investors over time, 
especially since 2001. We can also notice that buying activities are usually higher than 
selling for all investor categories (however, it is worth mentioning that these numbers 
are not abnormal trading activities unlike NABs presented in Table 16). 
[Insert Table 17 about Here] 
4.3.2. Other Control Variables 
 
 In order to further disentangle the effects of trading range hypothesis from those 
of the signaling associated with stock splits, I am going to control for the liquidity of 
stocks during 12 months leading split announcements as one of the main motivations for 
splitting stocks. I am using a measure of stock illiquidity proposed by Amihud (2002) 
and commonly used in literature. He defines stock illiquidity in a particular day as the 
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ratio of absolute value of daily returns over daily trading volume and quantifies it as a 
percentage price change per dollar of daily trading volume i.e. price change to excess 
demand for trading. The higher the variation in prices to accommodate excess trading 
the less liquid the asset is. The illiquidity ratio over a specific period looks as follows: 
										ࡵࡸࡸࡵࡽ࢏࢟ 	ൌ 	૚ ࡰ࢏࢟ൗ ∗ 	∑
|ࡾ࢏࢟ࢊ| ࢂࡻࡸࡰ࢏࢜࢟ࢊ൘
ࡰ࢏࢟
࢚ୀ૚    
 Where, ࡰ࢏࢟ is the number of trading days for stock i in the named period (12 
months). ࡾ࢏࢟ࢊ is daily returns of a stock in a particular day of the year and ࢂࡻࡸࡰ࢏࢜࢟ࢊ 
stands for dollar trading volume each trading day. I measure average illiquidity of 
stocks during 12 months before split announcement days. 
 I also control for stock performance before splits by computing daily stock 
returns and return volatilities (standard deviation of daily returns) during 365 days prior 
to split announcements. This takes care of the fact that greatly increased prices (returns) 
call for split measures. Further, I compute abnormal returns around stock split 
announcements by conducting a conventional event study analysis (following 
MacKinlay, 1997) using the market model for calculating stock returns. I first estimate 
normal stock return performance for each firm during 200 trading days 30 days before 
stock split announcements. Then, I calculate abnormal returns by taking actual returns 
recorded 3 days around announcement days and subtract from them previously 
estimated predicted returns for the same period. By summing up the values for the three 
event days (-1,0,+1) I get cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). Average CARs for the 
whole sample is 1.4%. This suggests a positive short-term stock reaction to stock splits 
as also found in the previous studies. 
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 In addition, I consider other firm specific characteristics frequently used in stock 
split literature such as firm size (total assets) and market-to-book ratio. Data comes from 
Compustat and CRSP. Descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in Table 18. 
Medium investors are represented by the highest net abnormal buying around three days 
of stock split announcements and large investor by the lowest buying. 
[Insert Table 18 about Here] 
 
4.4. Research Design and Results 
 
4.4.1. Net Abnormal Buying and Split Size 
 
 In order to check the signaling value of stock split announcements I am going to 
measure the effects of stock split sizes on net abnormal buying behaviors of different 
investors. I estimate the following equation using OLS estimation method. 
										ࡺࢇ࢈࢏,࢚ 	ൌ 		ࢇ ൅ ࢼ૚ ∗ ࡿ࢓ࢇ࢒࢒_ࡿ࢖࢒࢏࢚࢏,࢚	 ൅ ࢼ૛ ∗ ࡸࢇ࢘ࢍࢋ_ࡿ࢖࢒࢏࢚࢏,࢚	 ൅ 	∑ࢼ࢐ ∗ ࢄ࢏,࢚ ൅ 	ࢿ࢏,࢚    (11) 
 Where, NAB stands for cumulative net abnormal buying of relevant investor 
category (Small/Med/Large). I distinguish between the size of splits where Small/Large 
Splits represent dummy variables equal to 1 (two-for-one splits) if the split factor is 
less/more than 1 and zero otherwise, respectively. The reference category is medium 
splits (the ones with size equal to 1). X stands for other control variables - firm size 
(total assets), market-to-book ratio, stock illiquidity, returns and volatilities prior to 
splits, together with industry and year dummies. The assumption is that the higher the 
split factor the more positive news it is believed to convey to the market. 
 The results of estimation are provided in Table 19, which shows that small 
investors cannot distinguish between large and small splits when defining their trading 
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strategies. Remarkably, large investors show net buying behavior on only large splits 
which are believed to convey more positive signals about the future performance of the 
companies. 
[Insert Table 19 about Here] 
4.4.2. Split Size and Firm Investor Base 
 
 To further investigate this finding I check if investor base affects managers' 
decision on the size of the split. So I estimate the following OLS regression:  
	ࡿ࢖࢒࢏࢚_ࡿ࢏ࢠࢋ࢏,࢚ 	ൌ 		ࢇ ൅	ࢼ૚ ∗ ࢀ࢘ࢇࢊࢋ_ࡿ࢏ࢠࢋቊ ࡿ࢓ࢇ࢒࢒ࡹࢋࢊ࢏࢛࢓ࡸࢇࢍࢋ ቋ࢏,࢚ି૚	
൅ 			∑	ࢼ࢐ࢄ࢏,࢚	 ൅ 	ࢿ࢏,࢚		             (12) 
 Where, the left hand side of the equation is the size of the split. Trade-Size 
stands for the average proportion of different investors in total trading volume 
throughout 10 trading days two weeks before the day of the split. i stands for a specific 
firm, t for event window and (t-1) for non-event window. The coefficient of interest is 
ߚଵ. Depending on my previous finding from model (1), I would expect this coefficient 
to be positive for large investors i.e. the higher the proportion of large investors in total, 
the higher will be the size of the announced split if managers want to communicate the 
positive information to their existing audience. 
 The results of the estimation are presented in Table 20,  where as expected, we 
see that the higher the proportion of large investors in investor base the higher the size 
of the consequent stock split and vice versa for small investors. Thus, I conclude that 
managers' take into account the investor base of the firm when they are deciding on the 
size of the split. 
[Insert Table 20 about Here] 
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 To advance in the examination of the signaling role of stock splits I conduct a 
matched pair analysis. I identify matching non-splitting firms for each of the splitting 
one in the sample. The matching is done based on 4 digit industry and the size of firms' 
total assets (for each of the splitting firms I pick out the closest match among the non-
splitting ones in terms of asset size within 4 digit industry) also done in Powell and 
Baker (1993). I identify 421 pairs (i.e. sample of 842 firms) in period 1993-2011. In 
order to explore the differences between the treatment (splitting) and matched firms, I 
conduct t-tests of the differences in means of paired two samples. The results are 
presented in Table 21. I find that large investors of splitting and matched firms show no 
statistically different buying behavior around event days. However, small (and medium) 
investors of splitting firms show much higher and significant net abnormal buying 
behavior compared to the matched ones. Trading volumes are also interesting to 
examine - we observe much smaller (larger) proportion of small (large) investors for 
forecasting firms. Looking at other characteristic controls, we observe that illiquidity 
has been lower for splitting firms which is contrary to the expectations. Returns, on the 
other hand, have been significantly high during the year leading up to split 
announcements, as expected. On top of that, cumulative abnormal returns are higher 
around split announcement days for treatment group. Market-to-book ratio (measure of 
overvaluation) is also high for splitting firms which could be considered as contrary to 
the intuition but otherwise quite frequently observed in the literature (Ikenberry et al., 
1995). 
[Insert Table 21 about Here] 
Daily distribution of NABs across treatment and control groups are provided in 
Table 22. The table shows that small investors of splitting firms are significantly more 
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net buyers around Days 0 and 1 compared to matching ones. Large investors do not 
show any statistically different behavior between the two groups. 
[Insert Table 22 about Here] 
4.4.3. Net Abnormal Buying in Matched Sample 
 
 To check the empirical differences in trading behaviors for splitting and non-
splitting firms I estimate the following OLS regression: 
										ࡺࢇ࢈࢏,࢚ 	ൌ 		ࢇ ൅ ࢼ૚ ∗ ࡿ࢖࢒࢏࢚࢚࢏࢔ࢍ࢏,࢚	 ൅ 	∑ࢼ࢐ ∗ ࢄ࢏,࢚ ൅ 	ࢿ࢏,࢚            (13)  
 Where, again NAB is the net abnormal buying of relevant investor category 
(Small/Med/Large). Splitting stands for a dummy variable equaling 1 if the firm 
announces a split and 0 otherwise. X stands for other control variables also used in 
equation (11). The data used is one to one matched sample, where each splitting firm is 
matched with one similar sized non-splitting firm from the same industry.  In case splits 
possess signaling values we expect to see a positive trading behavior of large investors 
contingent on the announcement of splits i.e. positive ߚଵ-s for large NABs. 
 The results from Table 23 show that small traders are the ones that are 
represented by positive net buying activities to split announcements. Large investors do 
not seem to be buying abnormally on splits, which goes against the signaling value of 
stock split announcements. Remarkably, large investors trade more on illiquid stocks, 
probably taking advantage of market opportunities. 
[Insert Table 23 about Here] 
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4.4.4. Probability of Stock Splits and Firm Investor Base 
 
 To further utilize the obtained information, I will examine whether the 
composition of firms investor base affects the probability of announcing stock splits. To 
estimate the probability of splitting stock I estimate the following logistic regression: 
																				ࡿ࢖࢒࢏࢚࢙࢏,࢚ 	ൌ 		ࢇ ൅	ࢼ૚ ∗ ࢀ࢘ࢇࢊࢋ_ࡿ࢏ࢠࢋቊ ࡿ࢓ࢇ࢒࢒ࡹࢋࢊ࢏࢛࢓ࡸࢇࢍࢋ ቋ࢏,࢚ି૚	
൅ 			∑	ࢼ࢐ࢄ࢏,࢚	 ൅ 	ࢿ࢏,࢚		           (14) 
Where, 
ࡼ࢘ሺࡿ࢖࢒࢏࢚࢙࢏,࢚ 	ൌ ૚ห	ࢄ૚,࢚ି૚	, ࢄ૛,࢚	 …ࢄ࢑,࢚	൯ ൌ 	 ૚૚ ൅	܍ିሺ܉ା∑઺ܒ∗܆ܑሻ 
 Where, the left hand side of the equation is a dummy variable stating the 
probability of splits (i.e. the variable is equal to one if firm has announced a split) 
conditionally on Xs (firm specific control variables, including industry and year 
dummies). Trade-Size stands for the average proportion of different investors' trade 
sizes in total trading volume throughout 10 trading days two weeks before the day of the 
split. i stands for a specific firm, t for event window and (t-1) for non-event window. 
Separate regressions are estimated for different types of investors - Small, Med and 
Large. The coefficient of interest is ߚଵ - the positive value signifies that more the trades 
initiated from the relevant investor category (i.e. investor base of a firm) the higher the 
probability of announcing splits. The data utilized in a one to one matched sample of 
splitting and non-splitting firms. 
 The results of the estimation are provided in Table 24. The larger the share of 
large (small) investors the more (less) the probability of announcing stock splits. This 
could be explained by the assumption that companies that choose to announce splits are 
more in need of and target at attracting small individual investors. On the other hand, 
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when they already have higher proportion of small investors trading on their stocks, 
they probably have less need to further attract individual traders.  
[Insert Table 24 about Here] 
 
4.5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
 Previous research has been heavily invested in identifying reasons and 
incentives behind stock splits. The two widely known hypotheses that has been emerged 
up to date are: i) the trading range hypothesis: splits are tailored to returning previously 
elevated stock prices to the optimal trading range and thus enhance liquidity and ii) the 
signaling hypothesis: splits convey favorable information about the future performance 
of companies (prices and earnings will keep going up further) to investors. Both 
hypotheses have been tested with numerous alternative measures and mixed results have 
been found up to date.  
 I want to further shed some light on signaling value of stock splits and overtake 
an empirical exercise to see what type of investors trade around stock split 
announcements. The previous findings show mixed results in this regard. Some claim 
that managers aim at increasing small investor base by making smaller priced stocks 
easily available to them, others show that large institutional investors are the ones who 
tend to trade on positive information. My choice to concentrate on split announcements 
rather than splits themselves is intentional to abstract from the possible effect of 
increased liquidity following splits and focus more on signaling value of the 
announcement rather than the optimal trading range hypothesis. My expectation is that 
if stock splits serve as signals of future performance of the firm than large investors 
should take advantage of the information and trade on it. 
 80 
 
 I employ intraday trading data from NYSE TAQ (trades and quotes) database to 
construct net abnormal buying of different investor categories based on their trade sizes 
as a proxy for their level of sophistication. Further, I gather matching firms for each 
splitting firm in order to check whether trading behavior of investors differ on similar 
stocks contingent on the announcement of stock splits.  
 The empirical tests show that large investors do not seem to be trading 
abnormally differently around stock split announcements in the sample of splitting and 
matching firms, whereas small investors exert positive and significant net buying 
behavior. This goes against the informational content of stock splits. However, I have 
found that large investors, unlike small ones, are buying abnormally more when splits 
are exceptionally large (more than two-for-one splits). Thus, although stock splits do 
not seem to serve as signals, the size of the split does. 
 Further, I also check whether firm investor base affects the probability of 
announcing splits and the size of the splits, if any. By taking the proportion of large, 
medium and small trades in the total trading volumes among splitting and non-splitting 
matching firms I find that the probability of splits increases with the trades initiated by 
large investors (more than $50,000 per transaction) and vise versa for small traders (less 
than $7,000). I conclude that managers want to change firm investor base by attracting 
smaller investors through lower prices achieved after stock splits. Further, CEOs also 
take into account firm investor base when they are deciding on the size of the splits. I 
find that the proportion of large (small) investors is positively (negatively) correlated 
with the size of stock splits.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Final Remarks 
 
 The agency problem of misalignment of interests between managers and 
shareholders has been a long standing issue in the corporate world and the need to 
alleviate the problem is still active. Managerial pay incentives have been promoted in 
the past as one of the ways to make CEOs' wealth depend on firm value which would 
induce them to act more in shareholders' best interests. An interesting test would be to 
check if effective managerial contracts incentivize them to address certain actions that 
could be beneficial for shareholders.  
 I start by assuming that costless CEO voluntary actions that attract market's 
attention serve to decrease undervaluation problems in firms and thus could be 
considered as desirable in some circumstances. Having this is mind, I tried to set up a 
link between managerial variable compensation and its role in the consequent 
managerial actions towards attracting attention. The evidence found indicates that the 
more variable CEOs' compensations are the more the probability that they will attract 
market's attention by using "cheap talk" measures.  
 The policy implication of this finding is noteworthy for firm shareholders: When 
designing CEO compensation contracts, they need to take into consideration the 
provided incentives' possible effect on CEO disclosure policies. It is especially 
important as I also find evidence that CEO pay-for-performance incentives that are 
correlated with their disclosure policies also have an effect on investors' trading reaction 
to these disclosures. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean Median Max Min St. Dev. 
Leverage 2.69 1.27 99.5 0 4.84 
Market-to-Book 3.20 2.15 99.4 0 4.48 
Total Assets ($mln) 13 1.6 3222 0 76.6 
Stock Returns  0.15 0.07 6.33 -0.97 0.73 
CARs (significant) 0.03 0.05 0.50 -0.22 0.10 
Analyst Following 79 50 579 0 93 
Analyst Ups 14.5 5 312 0 23 
Analyst Downs 14 4 308 0 22.5 
Compensation Delta ($mln) 0.18 0.04 51 0 0.72 
Total Compensation ($mln) 4.5 2.3 645 0 9.4 
Variable Compensation 0.54 0.59 1.21 0 0.28 
Bonuses 0.14 0.09 1 0 0.17 
Stocks 0.13 0 1 0 0.20 
Stock Options 0.27 0.22 1 0 0.28 
CEO Age 56 55 95 28 7.5 
CEO Tenure 7 5 60 0 7.3 
CEO Forecasts 1.06 0 18 0 2.0 
Media Coverage 359 142 23 531 0 883 
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Table 2. Comparative Statistics 
The table reports one year lagged mean values for several variables for firms trying to 
attract attention through stock splits, EPS forecast or media coverage in a given year, and 
compare them to the mean values of the rest of the sample. Stars indicate significance at 
levels 1% (***), 5 %(**) and 10 %(*), respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Control Variables 
Stock Splits EPS Forecasts Media Coverage 
Yes 
(Obs=2405) 
No 
(Obs=31424) 
Yes 
(Obs=10422) 
No 
(Obs=23408) 
Top 50 pct 
(Obs=9380) 
Bottom 50 pct 
(Obs=9432) 
Leverage (t-1)         2.6 2.7 2.4 2.8*** 2.9 2.5*** 
Market-to-Book (t-1) 4.7 3.1*** 3.5 3.1*** 3.4 3.0*** 
Log Assets (t-1)            7.40 7.52*** 7.8 7.4*** 8.4 6.9*** 
Stock Returns (t-1) 0.50 0.12*** 0.16 0.14** 0.16 0.15 
Analyst Following (t-1) 88 79*** 101 70*** 114 58*** 
Analyst Following Ups (t-1) 19 15*** 19 13*** 23 10*** 
Analyst Following Downs (t-1) 11 14*** 15 13*** 22 10*** 
Log Delta (t-1) 4.41 3.99*** 4.49 3.82*** 4.8 3.7*** 
Total Compensation (t-1) 5046 4483*** 5693 4002*** 7097 3073*** 
Variable Compensation (t-1)       0.60 0.54*** 0.58 0.52*** 0.59 0.52*** 
Bonuses (t-1) 0.20 0.14*** 0.13 0.15*** 0.12 0.15*** 
Stocks (t-1) 0.08 0.13*** 0.15 0.11*** 0.18 0.10*** 
Options (t-1) 0.31 0.27*** 0.30 0.26*** 0.30 0.27*** 
CEO Age              55 56 55 56** 56 56 
CEO Tenure           8.7 7.0*** 6.8 7.3*** 6.9 7.7*** 
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Table 3. CEO Variable Compensation and Cheap Talk 
The table reports estimation results for Hypothesis 1 of Chapter 2. Dependent variables 
are the three measures of cheap talk (stock splits, CEO voluntary EPS forecasts and firm 
media coverage). All independent variables are one year lagged variables except for CEO 
Age and CEO Tenure. T statistics are provided in parentheses. Stars indicate significance 
at levels 1% (***), 5 %(**) and 10 %(*), respectively. 
Cheap Talk Splits (1) 
Splits 
(2) 
Forecasts 
(3) 
Forecasts 
(4) 
Media 
(5) 
Media 
(6) 
Variable Compensation 
(t-1) 
0.477*** 
(3.60) - 
0.122*** 
(2.86) - 
27.1*** 
(3.74) - 
Log (Compensation Delta) 
(t-1) - 
0.133*** 
(4.96) - 
0.045*** 
(5.95) - 
3.70*** 
(3.14) 
Age -0.026*** (-3.43) 
-0.031*** 
(-3.49) 
-0.005** 
(-2.19) 
-0.009*** 
(-3.08) 
-0.406 
(-0.96) 
-0.629 
(-1.28) 
Tenure 0.038*** (4.92) 
0.040*** 
(4.46) 
0.001 
(0.27) 
0.000 
(-0.05) 
-0.005 
(-0.01) 
0.004 
(0.01) 
Leverage (t-1) -0.000 (-0.39) 
0.000 
(-0.09) 
0.000 
(0.81) 
0.000 
(1.25) 
-0.714*** 
(-3.44) 
-0.693*** 
(-3.07) 
Market-To-Book (t-1) 0.000 (0.17) 
0.000 
(-0.16) 
0.000 
(-0.50) 
-0.000 
(-0.94) 
0.571*** 
(3.40) 
0.548*** 
(3.01) 
Log Assets (t-1) 0.064* (1.93) 
0.022 
(0.58) 
0.038*** 
(3.35) 
0.023* 
(1.78) 
14.9*** 
(7.07) 
15.7*** 
(6.56) 
Returns (t-1) 0.522*** (11.58) 
0.493*** 
(9.83) 
0.019 
( 1.45) 
0.008 
( 0.53) 
-2.932 
(-0.05) 
-3.34 
(-1.48) 
Constant - - -0.124 (-0.70) 
0.003 
(0.01) 
45.36* 
(1.67) 
43.16 
(1.39) 
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
No. Obs 13810 11029 26658 22745 15270 13391 
R^2 - - 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.11 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 - - - - 
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Table 4. Cheap Talk and Analyst Following 
The table reports estimation results of Hypothesis 2 of Chapter 2, using as dependent 
variables the total number of analysis following the firm (All) and changes (Ups or 
Downs) in the number of EPS estimates issued by analysts for a given firm in a given 
year. All independent variables are lagged one period. T statistics are provided in 
parentheses. Stars indicate significance at levels 1% (***), 5 %(**) and 10%(*), 
respectively.  
 
 
Analyst Following 
Stock Splits CEO Forecasts Log (Media Coverage) 
Analyst # of Estimates Analyst # of Estimates Analyst # of Estimates 
All 
(1) 
Ups 
(2) 
Downs 
(3) 
All 
(1) 
Ups 
(2) 
Downs 
(3) 
All 
(1) 
Ups 
(2) 
Downs 
(3) 
Cheap Talk (t-1) 6.28*** (5.67) 
0.680* 
(1.91) 
1.443*** 
(3.62) 
0.678*** 
(3.72) 
0.205*** 
(3.50) 
-0.171*** 
(-2.60) 
3.585*** 
(7.36) 
0.700*** 
(3.65) 
0.663*** 
(3.09) 
Leverage (t-1) -0.010 (-1.03) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
-0.004 
(-1.18) 
-0.009 
(-1.05) 
0.000 
(-0.01) 
-0.004 
(-1.20) 
-0.135*** 
(-2.94) 
-0.011 
(-0.61) 
-0.067*** 
(-3.31) 
Market-To-Book 
(t-1) 
0.005 
(0.43) 
0.000 
(0.08) 
0.004* 
(1.08) 
0.005 
(0.46) 
0.000 
(0.08) 
0.004 
(1.12) 
0.103*** 
(2.75) 
0.008 
(0.55) 
0.055*** 
(3.34) 
Log Assets (t-1) 5.97*** (17.94) 
1.125*** 
(10.51) 
1.612*** 
(13.46) 
5.802*** 
(17.35) 
1.084*** 
(10.08) 
1.630*** 
(13.56) 
3.925*** 
(7.21) 
0.296 
(1.38) 
1.782*** 
(7.45) 
Returns (t-1) -0.849** (-2.07) 
1.109*** 
(8.39) 
-1.751*** 
(-11.84) 
-0.547 
(-1.34) 
1.146*** 
(8.73) 
-1.693*** 
(-11.53) 
-1.075** 
(-2.40) 
0.976*** 
(5.55) 
-1.587*** 
(-8.07) 
Constant 17.03*** (5.31) 
-1.665 
(-1.61) 
-1.05 
(-0.91) 
17.80*** 
(5.55) 
-1.560 
(-1.51) 
-0.927 
(-0.80) 
18.42*** 
(3.24) 
4.68** 
(2.09) 
-6.42*** 
(-2.57) 
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
No. Obs 30166 30166 30166 30166 30166 30166 13855 13855 13855 
R^2 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.15 0.08 0.12 
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Table 5. The Effect of Cheap Talk on CEO Punishment 
The table reports estimation results for Hypothesis 3 of Chapter 2. Dependent variables 
represent CEO Turnover and CEO total compensation (TC) for all three measures of cheap 
talk. All independent variables with sign (t-1) represent one year lagged values. T statistics 
are provided in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at levels 1% (***), 5 %(**) and 10 
%(*), respectively. 
 
CEO Punishment 
Stock Splits CEO Forecasts Log (Media Coverage) 
Turnover 
(1) 
TC 
(2) 
Turnover 
(1) 
TC 
(2) 
Turnover 
(1) 
TC 
(2) 
Cheap Talk (t-1) -2.666*** 
(-5.32) 
1108*** 
(3.99) 
-0.053*** 
(-2.79) 
108.9** 
(2.40) 
0.075 
(1.42) 
18.99 
(0.15) 
CARs -26.812*** (-2.63) 
67703*** 
(8.50) - - - - 
Cheap Talk *Returns (t-1) - - 
-0.051 
(-1.30) 
127.7* 
(1.73) 
-0.017 
(-0.21) 
245** 
(2.18) 
Variable Compensation (t-1) 
-0.874*** 
(-6.58) - 
-0.871*** 
(-6.70) - 
-1.058*** 
(-5.06) - 
Total Compensation (t-1) - 
0.076*** 
(10.33) 
- 
0.077*** 
(10.40) 
- 
-0.017** 
(-1.99) 
Returns (t-1) 
-0.121* 
(-1.91) 
631.9*** 
(6.16) 
-0.082 
(-1.23) 
644.24*** 
(5.91) 
-0.055 
(-0.14) 
-650 
(-0.15) 
Leverage (t-1) 
0.000 
(0.15) 
-0.509 
(-0.30) 
0.000 
(0.11) 
-0.545 
(-0.32) 
-0.002 
(-0.46) 
-16.00 
(-1.43) 
Market-To-Book 
(t-1) 
-0.007** 
(-2.11) 
1.092 
(0.53) 
-0.007** 
(-2.06) 
1.177 
(0.57) 
0.000 
(-0.11) 
12.93 
(1.42) 
Log Assets (t-1) 
0.070* 
(1.43) 
275*** 
(3.38) 
0.086*** 
(3.03) 
245*** 
(2.98) 
0.083 
(1.62) 
237* 
(1.77) 
Age 
-0.019* 
(-1.92) 
-44.39* 
(-1.77) 
-0.018* 
(-1.94) 
-48.03* 
(-1.91) 
-0.008 
(-0.45) 
27.01 
(0.73) 
Tenure -0.376*** 
(-20.83) 
94.4*** 
(3.87) 
-0.389*** 
(-21.77) 
100.8*** 
(4.13) 
-0.357*** 
(-12.66) 
59.33* 
(1.68) 
Constant - 
3665** 
(2.35) 
- 
3813** 
(2.44) 
- 
-229 
(-0.10) 
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
No. Obs 9422 19180 9784 19180 3490 9048 
R^2 - 0.09 - 0.08 - 0.02 
Prob>chi2 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 
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Table 6. Components of CEO Variable Compensation and Cheap Talk  
The table reports estimation results of testing the hypothesis 1 of Chapter 2 for breakdown 
of CEO variable compensation into bonuses, stocks and options. Dependent variables 
represent cheap talk proxies, as indicated. All independent variables with sign (t-1) 
represent one year lagged values. T statistics are provided in parentheses. Stars indicate 
significance at levels 1% (***), 5 %(**) and 10 %(*), respectively. 
Cheap Talk 
 
Stock Splits 
 
CEO Forecasts 
 
Media Coverage 
 
Bonuses (t-1) 1.195*** (5.54) 
0.200*** 
(2.72) 
19.0 
(1.51) 
Stocks (t-1) 0.624*** (3.01) 
0.074 
(1.20) 
41.5*** 
(4.17) 
Options (t-1) 0.360*** (2.56) 
0.127*** 
(2.71) 
21.5*** 
(2.65) 
Age -0.027*** (-3.52) 
-0.005** 
(-2.21) 
-0.397 
(-0.94) 
Tenure 0.038*** (4.91) 
0.000 
(0.20) 
0.035 
(0.08) 
Leverage (t-1) -0.000 (-0.45) 
0.000 
(0.80) 
-0.719*** 
(-3.47) 
Market-To-Book (t-1) 0.000 (0.26) 
0.000 
(-0.48) 
0.575*** 
(3.42) 
Log Assets (t-1) 0.064* (1.89) 
0.040*** 
(3.48) 
14.3*** 
(6.77) 
Returns (t-1) 0.494 (10.97) 
0.017 
(1.29) 
-2.766 
(-1.34) 
Constant - -0.126 (-0.71) 
51.13* 
(1.88) 
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES YES 
No. Obs 13810 26658 15270 
R^2 - 0.14 0.11 
Prob>chi2 0.000 - - 
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Table 7.  Components of Variable Compensation and CEO Turnover 
The table reports estimation results of testing hypothesis 3 of Chapter 2 for breakdown of 
CEO variable compensation. Dependent variable represents CEO turnover for all three 
measures of cheap talk, as indicated. All independent variables with sign (t-1) represent 
one year lagged values. T statistics are provided in parentheses. Stars indicate significance 
at levels 1% (***), 5 %(**) and 10 %(*), respectively. 
CEO Turnover 
 
Stock Splits 
 
CEO Forecasts 
 
Log (Media Coverage) 
 
Cheap Talk (t-1) -2.658*** (-5.32) 
-0.055*** 
(-2.87) 
0.080 
(1.44) 
CARs (t-1) -26.49** (-2.64) - - 
Cheap Talk *Returns (t-1) - -0.048 (-1.23) 
-0.055 
(-0.70) 
Bonuses (t-1) -1.288*** (-4.92) 
-1.257*** 
(-4.97) 
-1.772*** 
(-4.25) 
Stocks (t-1) -0.242 (-1.28) 
-0.225 
(-1.21) 
-0.334 
(-1.15) 
Options (t-1) -1.083*** (-7.21) 
-1.079*** 
(-7.40) 
-1.281*** 
(-5.26) 
Returns (t-1) -0.097 (-1.52) 
-0.063 
(-0.95) 
0.171 
(0.44) 
Leverage (t-1) 0.000 (0.18) 
0.000 
(0.15) 
-0.004 
(-0.79) 
Market-To-Book (t-1) -0.007** (-2.11) 
-0.007** 
(-2.03) 
0.001 
(0.09) 
Log Assets (t-1) 0.044 (1.51) 
0.059** 
(2.06) 
0.066 
(1.25) 
Age -0.018* (-1.88) 
-0.018* 
(-1.89) 
-0.012 
(-0.73) 
Tenure -0.369*** (-20.53) 
-0.382*** 
(-21.44) 
-0.340*** 
(-12.08) 
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES YES 
No. Obs 9422 9784 3379 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 8. CEO Incentives in Two Sample Periods 
The table reports estimation results for hypothesis 1 of Chapter 2, where the sample is 
divided into two subsamples 1992-2001 and 2002-2011, respectively. Dependent variables 
represent the three cheap talk proxies, as indicated. CEO incentives is represented by their 
variable compensation and compensation deltas. All independent variables with sign (t-1) 
represent one year lagged values. T statistics are provided in parentheses. Stars indicate 
significance at levels1% (***), 5 %(**) and 10 %(*), respectively. 
 
Cheap Talk 
1992-2001 2002-2011 
Stock Splits CEO Forecasts Stock Splits CEO Forecasts 
Variable Compensation 
(t-1) 
0.406** 
(2.24) - 
-0.014 
(-0.35) - 
0.066 
(0.29) - 
0.036 
(0.61) - 
Compensation Delta 
(t-1) - 
0.005 
(0.13)  
0.017*** 
(2.67) - 
0.063 
(1.48) - 
0.021* 
(1.83) 
Age 
-0.025** 
(-2.02) 
 
-0.028** 
(-1.96) 
 
0.004 
(1.53) 
0.004 
(1.29) 
-0.012 
(-0.72) 
-0.025 
(-1.21) 
-0.006* 
(-1.40) 
-0.007 
(-1.56) 
Tenure 0.031*** (2.45) 
0.028** 
(1.97) 
-0.009*** 
(3.34) 
-0.011*** 
(-3.61) 
0.020 
(1.24) 
0.026 
(1.26) 
0.006 
(1.56) 
0.005 
(1.12) 
Leverage (t-1) -0.004 (-0.75) 
-0.002 
(-0.28) 
0.000 
(-0.33) 
0.000 
(0.30) 
-0.009 
(-1.47) 
-0.008 
(-1.28) 
-0.001 
(-0.62) 
0.000 
(-0.04) 
Market-To-Book (t-1) 0.005 (0.58) 
0.007 
(0.64) 
0.003*** 
(2.49) 
0.006*** 
(3.39) 
0.036** 
(2.43) 
0.031** 
(2.02) 
0.001 
(0.55) 
0.000 
(-0.05) 
Log Assets (t-1) 0.110*** (2.45) 
0.121** 
(2.28) 
0.010 
(0.98) 
0.003 
(0.26) 
0.087 
(1.29) 
0.092 
(1.22) 
-0.003 
(-0.20) 
-0.010 
(-0.52) 
Returns (t-1) 0.823*** (11.26) 
0.893*** 
(10.23) 
0.051*** 
(3.58) 
0.049*** 
(2.75) 
0.117*** 
(2.73) 
 
0.128*** 
(2.48) 
 
-0.003*** 
(-0.16) 
-0.015 
(-0.80) 
Constant - - -0.234 (-1.29) 
-0.249 
(-1.11) - - 
0.092 
(0.31) 
0.075 
(0.25) 
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
No. Obs 5014 3820 11142 9010 4130 3394 15516 13735 
R^2 - - 0.13 0.15 - - 0.02 0.02 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 -  0.000 0.000 - - 
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     Table 9. Average Proportion of Trades in Total Trading Volume Around EPS Forecast Dates 
Trade 
Proportions 
Small Investors Medium Investors Large Investors 
All Buys Sells All Buys Sells All Buys Sells 
2002 0.15 0.08 0.07 0.36 0.19 0.17 0.47 0.25 0.21 
2003 0.19 0.10 0.09 0.38 0.20 0.17 0.41 0.22 0.19 
2004 0.22 0.11 0.10 0.38 0.21 0.17 0.37 0.21 0.17 
2005 0.21 0.11 0.10 0.39 0.21 0.18 0.37 0.20 0.17 
2006 0.24 0.12 0.12 0.41 0.22 0.20 0.31 0.17 0.15 
2007 0.36 0.18 0.18 0.39 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.11 0.09 
2008 0.54 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.06 0.07 
2009 0.56 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.06 0.06 
2010 0.48 0.24 0.24 0.33 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.06 0.07 
Average 0.30 0.15 0.15 0.36 0.19 0.17 0.3 0.16 0.14 
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Table 10. CEO Forecast Errors Across Years 
The Table presents the difference between CEO forecasts and other EPS forecasts issued by 
analysts, CEOs themselves previous to the current ones and the actual year-end GAAP earnings. 
 
Forecast Errors FE-Analyst FE-Actual FE-Forecast 
2002 -0.003 0.023 -0.003 
2003 -0.003 0.027 -0.002 
2004 -0.001 0.010 -0.001 
2005 -0.001 0.006 -0.001 
2006 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 
2007 -0.002 0.009 -0.002 
2008 -0.003 0.052 -0.003 
2009 -0.001 0.019 -0.002 
2010 -0.001 -0.003 0.001 
Average -0.002 0.017 -0.002 
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Table 11. Descriptive Statistics of Variables from Chapter 4 
Descriptive Statistics Mean St. Dev Min Max 
Small NABs (cumulative) 0.03 0.26 -1.42 6.18 
Medium NABs (cumulative) 0.06 0.31 -1.20 2.90 
Large NABs (cumulative) 0.06 0.712 -7.50 5.82 
Small NABs_(-1) 0.00 0.07 -0.61 0.57 
Small NABs_(0) 0.01 0.15 -0.64 3.86 
Small NABs_(1) 0.01 0.13 -1.09 1.97 
Med NABs_(-1) 0.01 0.12 -0.95 1.84 
Med NABs_(0) 0.03 0.16 -0.81 1.61 
Med NABs_(1) 0.03 0.16 -0.91 1.89 
Large NABs (-1) 0.00 0.22 -1.49 1.88 
Large NABs (0) 0.04 0.38 -2.52 3.95 
Large NABs_(1) 0.02 0.50 -7.68 5.67 
Small trades 0.30 0.23 0.00 0.89 
Medium trades 0.36 0.14 0.05 0.95 
Large trades 0.30 0.20 0.00 0.87 
FE Forecast 0.00 0.01 -0.23 0.14 
FE Analysts 0.00 0.01 -0.15 0.03 
FE Actual 0.02 0.08 -0.32 1.21 
Compensation Delta (thsnd) 335 906 0.00 19614 
Vested Stocks & Exercisable options (ratio) 2.55 6.41 0.00 121 
Returns 0.09 0.48 -0.93 4.49 
Return Volatility 0.38 0.16 0.11 1.39 
Leverage 2.5 19.7 -146 602 
Market-to-Book 3.3 12.4 -78.5 369 
Total Assets ($ Mln)  17.1 66.9 0.026 798 
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Table 12a. Net Abnormal Buys of Different Investor Categories Around CEO EPS 
Forecast Dates 
 
The table reports estimation results for hypotheses 1 and 2 of Chapter 3. Dependent variable 
represents Net Abnormal Buys around CEO EPS forecasts for each investor category in three 
different columns. Main control variables are forecast errors and the interaction terms between 
CEO compensation delta and forecast errors. T statistics are provided in parentheses. Stars 
indicate significance at levels 1% (***), 5 %(**) and 10 %(*), respectively.  
 
 
Net Abnormal Buying (NAB) Small Investors Medium Investors Large Investors 
Model 1: 
ܾܰܽ௜,௧ 	ൌ 		ܽ ൅ ߚଵ ∗ ܨܧ_ܣ݈݊ܽݕݏݐ௜,௧	 ൅ ߚଶ ∗ ܥ݋݉݌௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷ ∗ ܨܧ_ܣ݈݊ܽݕݏݐ௜,௧ ∗ ܥ݋݉݌௜,௧ିଵ	 ൅		∑ߚ௝ ∗ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ 
FE-Analyst 5.221** (2.33)
11.558*** 
(3.46) 
7.294 
(0.86) 
 Log (Compensation-Delta)  -0.001 (-0.10) 
0.012* 
(1.75) 
0.004 
(0.22) 
FE-Analyst*Log (Comp-Delta)  -1.149** (-2.44)
-2.247*** 
(-3.21) 
-1.836 
(-1.03) 
Market Volume 0.000 (0.15) 
-0.000 
(-0.03) 
0.000 
(0.37) 
Log Assets  -0.012** (-2.42) 
-0.025*** 
(-3.31) 
-0.040** 
(-2.07) 
Market-To-Book  -0.002 (-0.93) 
-0.008** 
(-2.03) 
-0.006 
(-0.57) 
Leverage  0.002 (0.77) 
0.004 
(1.20) 
0.005 
(0.65) 
Returns  0.040** (1.99) 
0.040 
(1.32) 
0.116 
(1.51) 
Volatility of Returns -0.164*** (-3.31) 
-0.242*** 
(-3.28) 
0.009 
(0.05) 
Constant 0.238** (2.12) 
0.627*** 
(3.75) 
0.302 
(0.71) 
Year Dummies 
Industry Dummies 
No Obs 
Adj. R^2. 
YES 
YES 
674 
0.012 
YES 
YES 
674 
0.037 
YES 
YES 
673 
0.011 
Model 2: 
ܾܰܽ௜,௧ 	ൌ 		ܽ ൅ ߚଵ ∗ ܨܧ_ܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶ ∗ ܥ݋݉݌௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷ ∗ ܨܧ_ܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ௜,௧ ∗ ܥ݋݉݌௜,௧ିଵ	 ൅	∑ߚ௝ ∗ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ 
FE-Actual -0.105 (-0.46)
-0.986*** 
(-2.89)
-2.235*** 
(-2.82)
Log(Compensation-Delta)  0.002 (0.37)
0.009 
(1.24)
0.001 
(0.02)
FE-Actual*Log(Comp-Delta)  0.011 (0.23)
0.185** 
(2.53)
0.428** 
(2.52) 
Market Volume 0.000 (0.28) 
0.000 
(0.25) 
0.000 
(0.99) 
Log Assets  -0.008 (-1.55) 
-0.023*** 
(-2.85) 
-0.023 
(-1.23) 
Market-To-Book  -0.002 (-0.88) 
-0.008** 
(-2.05) 
-0.005 
(-0.56) 
Leverage  0.001 (0.34) 
0.003 
(0.89) 
0.007 
(0.77) 
Returns  0.046** (2.17) 
0.060* 
(1.90) 
0.086 
(1.17) 
Volatility of Returns -0.106** (-2.04) 
-0.183** 
(-2.33) 
0.016 
(0.09) 
Volatility 0.142 (1.21) 
0.515*** 
(2.92) 
0.253 
(0.62) 
 104 
 
Year Dummies 
Industry Dummies 
No Obs 
Adj. R^2. 
YES 
YES 
698 
0.003 
YES 
YES 
698 
0.024 
YES 
YES 
696 
0.027 
Model 3: 
ܾܰܽ௜,௧ 	ൌ 		ܽ ൅ ߚଵ ∗ ܨܧ_ܨ݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶ ∗ ܥ݋݉݌௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷ ∗ ܨܧ_ܨ݅ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ௜,௧ ∗ ܥ݋݉݌௜,௧ିଵ	 ൅	∑ߚ௝ ∗ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ 
FE-Forecast 3.376** (2.46) 
1.100 
(0.56) 
7.144 
(1.42) 
 Log(Compensation-Delta)  0.001 (0.24)
0.014** 
(2.20)
0.010 
(0.59)
FE-Forecast*Log(Comp-Delta)  -0.679** (-2.24)
-0.150 
(-0.35) 
-1.800 
(-1.62) 
Market Volume 0.000 (0.11) 
0.000 
(0.06) 
0.000 
(1.00) 
Log Assets  -0.008 (-1.57) 
-0.019*** 
(-2.49) 
-0.036* 
(-1.85) 
Market-To-Book  -0.003 (-1.06) 
-0.008** 
(2.10) 
-0.004 
(-0.37) 
Leverage  0.002 (0.67) 
0.004 
(1.18) 
0.003 
(0.41) 
Returns  0.031 (1.55) 
0.052* 
(1.80) 
0.066 
(0.90) 
Volatility of Returns -0.102** (-1.98) 
-0.170** 
(-2.32) 
0.021 
(0.11) 
Constant 0.136 (1.19) 
0.342** 
(2.11) 
-0.054 
(-0.13) 
Year Dummies 
Industry Dummies 
No Obs 
Adj. R^2. 
YES 
YES 
662 
0.00 
YES 
YES 
662 
0.015 
YES 
YES 
661 
0.012 
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Table 12b. Short Term Incentives and NABs around CEO EPS Forecast Dates 
The table reports estimation results for CEO short term incentives from Chapter 3. Dependent 
variable represents Net Abnormal Buys around CEO EPS forecasts for each investor category in 
three different columns. Main control variables are forecast errors and the interaction terms 
between CEO short term incentives and forecast errors. T statistics are provided in parentheses. 
Stars indicate significance at levels 1% (***), 5 %(**) and 10 %(*), respectively.  
 
Net Abnormal Buying (NAB) Small Investors 
Medium 
Investors 
Large  
Investors 
Model 1: 
ܾܰܽ௜,௧ 	ൌ 		ܽ ൅ ߚଵ ∗ ܨܧ_ܣ݈݊ܽݕݏݐ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶ ∗ ܥ݋݉݌௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷ ∗ ܨܧ_ܣ݈݊ܽݕݏݐ௜,௧ ∗ ܥ݋݉݌௜,௧ିଵ	 ൅	∑ߚ௝ ∗ ௜ܺ,௧
൅ 	ߝ௜,௧ 
FE-Analyst 0.185 (0.17)
1.585 
(0.96) 
0.443 
(0.10) 
 Vested-Stocks&Exercisable-
Options  
-0.002 
(-0.42) 
-0.010*** 
(-4.72) 
-0.019*** 
(-3.33) 
FE-Analyst* Vested-
Stocks&Exercisable-Options  
-0.753 
(-1.53)
-1.369* 
(-1.84) 
-4.273** 
(-2.20) 
Market Volume 0.000 (1.42) 
0.000 
(0.15) 
-0.000 
(-0.42) 
Log Assets  -0.012*** (-2.69) 
-0.017*** 
(-2.58) 
-0.048*** 
(-2.71) 
Market-To-Book  -0.003 (-1.20) 
-0.006 
(-1.58) 
-0.005 
(-0.55) 
Leverage  0.003 (1.06) 
0.004 
(0.99) 
0.010 
(0.87) 
Returns  0.018 (0.89) 
0.029 
(0.95) 
0.115 
(1.44) 
Volatility of Returns -0.107** (-2.28) 
-0.212*** 
(-2.98) 
-0.165 
(-0.89) 
Constant 0.157 (1.36) 
0.549*** 
(3.17) 
0.693 
(1.60) 
Year Dummies 
Industry Dummies 
No Obs 
Adj. R^2. 
YES 
YES 
674 
-0.001 
YES 
YES 
674 
0.043 
YES 
YES 
673 
0.041 
Model 2: 
ܾܰܽ௜,௧ 	ൌ 		ܽ ൅ ߚଵ ∗ ܨܧ_ܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶ ∗ ܥ݋݉݌௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷ ∗ ܨܧ_ܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ௜,௧ ∗ ܥ݋݉݌௜,௧ିଵ	 ൅	∑ߚ௝ ∗ ௜ܺ,௧
൅ 	ߝ௜,௧ 
FE-Actual -0.114 (-1.35)
-0.009 
(-0.07)
0.025 
(0.08)
Vested-Stocks&Exercisable-
Options 
-0.000 
(-0.02) 
-0.005 
(-1.50) 
-0.012 
(-1.54) 
FE-Actual* Vested-
Stocks&Exercisable-Options 
-0.038 
(-0.85)
-0.204*** 
(-3.04)
-0.172 
(-0.98) 
Market Volume 0.000* (1.71) 
0.000 
(0.50) 
-0.000 
(-0.01) 
Log Assets  -0.008 (-1.63) 
-0.018** 
(-1.54) 
-0.044** 
(-2.31) 
Market-To-Book  -0.003 (-1.20) 
-0.009** 
(-2.33) 
-0.012 
(-1.17) 
Leverage  0.002 (0.60) 
0.009 
(1.64) 
0.024* 
(1.65) 
Returns  0.009 (0.45) 
0.023 
(0.75) 
0.083 
(1.02) 
Volatility of Returns -0.010 (-0.21)
-0.147** 
(-1.97)
-0.213 
(-1.09)
Constant 0.009 (0.07) 
0.338** 
(1.96) 
0.445 
(0.99) 
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Year Dummies 
Industry Dummies 
No Obs 
Adj. R^2. 
YES 
YES 
703 
-0.001 
YES 
YES 
703 
0.036 
YES 
YES 
700 
0.030 
Model 3: 
ܾܰܽ௜,௧ 	ൌ 		ܽ ൅ ߚଵ ∗ ܨܧ_ܨ݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶ ∗ ܥ݋݉݌௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷ ∗ ܨܧ_ܨ݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐ௜,௧	 ∗ ܥ݋݉݌௜,௧ିଵ
൅	∑ߚ௝ ∗ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ 
FE-Forecast 0.969 (1.36) 
0.080 
(0.08) 
3.573 
(1.30) 
 Vested-Stocks &Exercisable-
Options 
-0.003* 
(-1.74) 
-0.010*** 
(-4.56) 
-0.024*** 
(-3.97) 
FE-Forecast* Vested-
Stocks&Exercisable-Options 
-0.417 
(-1.32)
-0.394 
(-0.87) 
-4.104*** 
(-3.39) 
Market Volume 0.000 (1.30) 
0.000 
(0.33) 
0.000 
(0.29) 
Log Assets  -0.009* (-1.90) 
-0.001 
(-1.48) 
-0.040** 
(-2.24) 
Market-To-Book  -0.003 (-1.20)
-0.006 
(-1.61)
-0.003 
(-0.29)
Leverage  0.004 (1.40) 
0.006 
(1.41) 
0.009 
(0.79) 
Returns  0.007 (0.33) 
0.026 
(0.89) 
0.105 
(1.37) 
Volatility of Returns -0.039 (-0.81)
-0.112 
(-1.61)
-0.171 
(-0.92)
Constant 0.063 (0.55) 
0.238 
(1.44) 
0.596 
(1.35) 
Year Dummies 
Industry Dummies 
No Obs 
Adj. R^2. 
YES 
YES 
664 
-0.007 
YES 
YES 
664 
0.029 
YES 
YES 
663 
0.045 
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Table 13. Forecasted Error Sizes and Firm Investor Base 
The table reports estimation results for hypothesis 3 of Chapter 3. Dependent variable represents 
different forecast errors. Main control variables are proportions of investor trade proportions 
(small/medium/large) in the total trading volume around the announcement days. T statistics are 
provided in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at levels 1% (***), 5 %(**) and 10 %(*), 
respectively.  
Variables FE-Analyst FE-Actual FE-Forecast 
Small Trades 0.004 (0.80) - - 
0.009 
(0.17) - - 
0.014** 
(2.18) - - 
Medium Trades - 0.003 (0.38) - - 
-0.057 
(-0.70) - - 
0.018* 
(1.80) - 
Large Trades 
 - - 
-0.007 
(-1.24) - - 
0.010 
(0.15) - - 
-0.033*** 
(-3.97) 
Log Delta -0.000 (-0.52) 
-0.000 
(-0.73) 
-0.000 
(-0.63) 
-0.004 
(-0.89) 
-0.006 
(-0.91) 
-0.002 
(-0.54) 
0.000 
(0.61) 
0.001 
(0.66) 
-0.001*** 
(-2.59) 
Log Delta*Small Trades 0.000 (0.01) - - 
0.002 
(0.15) - - 
-0.001 
(-1.24) - - 
Log Delta*Med Trades - 0.003 (0.24) - - 
0.007 
(0.48) - - 
-0.002 
(-1.20) - 
Log Delta*Large Trades - - -0.000 (-0.04) - - 
-0.004 
(-0.30) - - 
0.004*** 
(2.57) 
Market Volume 0.000** (2.47) 
0.000* 
(1.92) 
0.000** 
(2.46) 
-0.000** 
(-1.04) 
-0.000 
(-1.09) 
-0.000 
(-1.18) 
0.000*** 
(2.80) 
0.000** 
(2.16) 
0.000*** 
(2.80) 
Log Assets 0.000 (0.33) 
-0.000 
(-0.36) 
0.000 
(1.06) 
0.007** 
(2.04) 
0.006** 
(1.98) 
0.006* 
(1.93) 
0.000 
(0.60) 
-0.000 
(-0.46) 
0.001 
(1.49) 
Market-To-Book 0.000 (1.62) 
0.000 
(1.20) 
0.000* 
(1.77) 
-0.001 
(-0.46) 
-0.001 
(-0.54) 
-0.001 
(-0.53) 
0.000 
(1.61) 
0.000 
(1.14) 
0.000* 
(1.80) 
Leverage -0.000 (-1.45) 
-0.000 
(-1.18) 
-0.000 
(-1.62)
0.002 
(1.62)
0.002* 
(1.66)
0.002* 
(1.67)
-0.000 
(-0.48) 
-0.000 
(-0.18)
-0.000 
(-0.78)
Returns 0.007*** (7.13) 
0.006*** 
(6.87) 
0.006*** 
(6.87) 
-0.071*** 
(-6.45) 
-0.070*** 
(-6.34) 
-0.071*** 
(-6.46) 
0.008*** 
(6.27) 
0.008*** 
(5.83) 
0.008*** 
(5.86) 
Volatility-Of-Returns -0.008*** (-3.49) 
-0.007*** 
(-2.90) 
-0.008*** 
(-3.30) 
0.110*** 
(3.91) 
0.108*** 
(3.86) 
0.112*** 
(4.05) 
-0.009*** 
(-2.62) 
-0.006* 
(-1.71) 
-0.009** 
(-2.49) 
Constant -0.002 (-0.34) 
0.0001 
(0.10) 
0.001 
(0.22) 
-0.050 
(-0.72) 
-0.022 
(-0.31) 
-0.042 
(-0.65) 
-0.013 
(-1.51) 
-0.010 
(-1.16) 
0.001 
(0.06) 
No Obs. 
Adj. R2 
Year Dummies 
Industry Dummies 
 
674 
0.10 
YES 
YES 
 
674 
0.10 
YES 
YES 
 
674 
0.11 
YES 
YES 
 
698 
0.12 
YES 
YES 
 
698 
0.12 
YES 
YES 
 
698 
0.12 
YES 
YES 
 
662 
0.08 
YES 
YES 
 
662 
0.08 
YES 
YES 
 
662 
0.11 
YES 
YES 
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Table 14 . Test of Mean Differences in Matched Pairs of Forecasting and Non-Forecasting 
Firms 
The table reports mean values of several variables for firms announcing EPS forecasts in a 
given year, and compare them to the mean values of the matched non-announcing firms in 
the same year. Stars indicate significance at levels 1% (***), 5 %(**) and 10 %(*), 
respectively. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Mean 
Forecasting 
Firm 
Mean 
Matching 
Firm 
T- Stat. 
of the  
Difference 
Small NABs 0.05 -0.01 2.18** 
Medium NABs 0.06 0.01 3.12*** 
Large NABs 0.07 -0.02 1.79* 
Small trades (Event Days) 0.39 0.43 -2.19** 
Medium trades (Event Days) 0.34 0.35 -1.03 
Large trades (Event Days) 0.24 0.18 3.83*** 
Small trades (Non- Event Days) 0.41 0.42 -0.90 
Medium trades (Non- Event Days) 0.34 0.34 -0.45 
Large trades (Non- Event Days) 0.21 0.20 1.30 
Compensation Delta 365 263 1.96** 
Vested Stocks & Exercisable options 2.01 2.10 -0.24 
Returns 0.07 0.09 0.75 
Leverage 1.96 1.89 0.50 
Market-to-Book 3.17 3.19 -0.12 
Total Assets (mln) 11.4 10.2 0.88 
Return Volatility 0.37 0.37 0.04 
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Table 15 . Probability of CEO EPS Forecasts and Firm Investor Base 
The table reports estimation results for hypothesis 3 of Chapter 3. Dependent variable represents 
a dummy variable, for which 1 signifies that the firm has issued a forecast. Main control 
variables are proportions of investor trade sizes (small/medium/large) in the total trading volume 
two weeks before the announcement days. T statistics are provided in parentheses. Stars indicate 
significance at levels 1% (***), 5 %(**) and 10 %(*), respectively. 
Probability of Forecast Small  Investors 
Medium  
Investors 
Large  
Investors 
Trade Proportions 1.162* (1.86) 
-1.145* 
(-1.74) 
-0.508 
(-0.54) 
 Log (Compensation-Delta) 0.068 (0.86) 
0.066 
(0.84) 
0.072 
(0.86) 
Log Assets  0.297*** (3.00)
0.242*** 
(2.68)
0.235** 
(2.48)
Market-To-Book  0.023 (0.59) 
0.015 
(0.40) 
0.001 
(0.04) 
Leverage  -0.053 (-1.36) 
-0.047 
(-1.22) 
-0.040 
(-1.06) 
Returns  -0.174 (-0.77) 
-0.147 
(-0.66) 
-0.156 
(-0.70) 
Volatility of Returns 1.468* (1.89) 
1.394* 
(1.80) 
1.599** 
(2.08) 
Constant -3.594*** (-3.24) 
-2.145** 
(-2.50) 
-2.391*** 
(-2.74) 
Year Dummies 
Industry Dummies 
No Obs 
Pseudo R^2. 
YES 
YES 
517 
0.03 
YES 
YES 
517 
0.03 
YES 
YES 
517 
0.02 
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Table 16. Cumulative Net Abnormal Buys Around 3 Days of Split Announcements 
NABs N Small Investors Medium Investors Large Investors 
1993 51 0.039 0.109 -0.278 
1994 58 0.023 0.142 0.304 
1995 59 0.020 0.069 -0.086 
1996 83 0.020 0.247 -0.080 
1997 100 0.022 0.122 0.096 
1998 86 0.022 0.221 -0.020 
1999 91 0.029 0.186 0.007 
2000 76 0.012 0.092 -0.109 
2001 26 0.017 0.084 0.154 
2002 27 0.014 0.016 0.084 
2003 19 0.042 0.115 0.045 
2004 28 -0.041 0.008 -0.015 
2005 38 0.013 0.027 0.007 
2006 18 0.073 0.145 -0.061 
2007 13 -0.053 0.105 0.009 
2008 4 -0.099 0.023 -0.026 
2009 2 -0.210 0.106 -0.094 
2010 8 -0.024 0.015 0.062 
2011 3 0.062 0.226 0.372 
Average 790 0.019 0.132 0.003 
 
  
 111 
 
Table 17. Trade Proportions of Different Investors Around Split Announcement Dates  
Share in Total N 
Small Investors Medium Investors Large Investors 
All Buys Sells All Buys Sells All Buys Sells 
1993 51 0.029 0.020 0.008 0.234 0.133 0.101 0.667 0.332 0.335 
1994 58 0.031 0.019 0.012 0.289 0.164 0.125 0.607 0.337 0.269 
1995 59 0.028 0.017 0.011 0.266 0.150 0.116 0.641 0.316 0.325 
1996 83 0.020 0.014 0.007 0.260 0.155 0.105 0.638 0.313 0.325 
1997 100 0.019 0.012 0.006 0.234 0.129 0.105 0.689 0.363 0.326 
1998 86 0.021 0.013 0.008 0.288 0.161 0.127 0.651 0.328 0.324 
1999 91 0.024 0.013 0.011 0.253 0.138 0.116 0.695 0.356 0.338 
2000 76 0.031 0.016 0.015 0.269 0.145 0.124 0.683 0.357 0.326 
2001 26 0.074 0.042 0.033 0.323 0.180 0.143 0.591 0.320 0.270 
2002 27 0.113 0.063 0.050 0.387 0.205 0.182 0.492 0.273 0.219 
2003 19 0.216 0.120 0.096 0.451 0.258 0.193 0.317 0.179 0.137 
2004 28 0.177 0.086 0.091 0.436 0.238 0.198 0.371 0.207 0.164 
2005 38 0.242 0.127 0.115 0.478 0.256 0.221 0.267 0.146 0.121 
2006 18 0.229 0.122 0.106 0.499 0.267 0.232 0.257 0.124 0.133 
2007 13 0.279 0.139 0.140 0.526 0.275 0.251 0.177 0.095 0.082 
2008 4 0.290 0.134 0.156 0.551 0.271 280 0.152 0.087 0.066 
2009 2 0.309 0.147 0.162 0.541 0.282 0.259 0.149 0.070 0.079 
2010 8 0.393 0.193 0.200 0.436 0.221 0.215 0.151 0.084 0.067 
2011 3 0.308 0.155 0.153 0.428 0.226 0.202 0.212 0.116 0.096 
Average 790 0.065 0.036 0.030 0.303 0.167 0.135 0.588 0.304 0.284 
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Table 18. Descriptive Statistics of Variables from Chapter 4 
 N Mean Min Max St. Dev. 
Small - NABs  790 0.019 -0.48 1.28 0.106 
Medium -NABs 790 0.132 -1.44 8.38 0.524 
Large - NABs 790 0.003 -8.70 6.63 0.932 
Small Trades 790 0.065 0.00 0.711 0.129 
Medium Trades 790 0.303 0.010 0.931 0.189 
Large Trades 790 0.588 0.00 0.966 0.234 
Total Assets (mln) 782 9.256 0.016 715 38.1 
Illiquidity (Amihud, *mln) 786 0.012 0.000 0.472 0.031 
CARs Around Splits 791 0.014 -0.184 0.263 0.051 
Volatility of Returns 786 0.507 0.119 1.635 0.266 
Returns 786 1.029 -0.373 5.824 0.862 
Market-to-Book 774 5.93 0.842 122 5.92 
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Table 19. Net Abnormal Buys Around Stock Splits Across Investor Categories 
Dependent variable represents Net Abnormal Buys around stock split announcements for each 
investor category in three different columns. Main control variables are the sizes of stock splits. 
T statistics are provided in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at levels 1% (***), 5 %(**) 
and 10 %(*), respectively.  
NABs Small Investors Medium Investors Large Investors 
Large Splits -0.003 (-0.22) 
-0.003 
(-0.19) 
-0.005 
(-0.33) 
0.129 
(1.56) 
0.161* 
(1.86) 
0.173** 
(2.01) 
0.316** 
(2.15) 
0.356** 
(2.31) 
0.378** 
(2.39) 
Small Splits 0.008 (1.18) 
0.005 
(0.66) 
-0.001 
(-0.15) 
0.009 
(0.22) 
0.009 
(0.19) 
-0.072* 
(1.65) 
0.058 
(0.82) 
0.012 
(0.16) 
0.033 
(0.41) 
Illiquidity (Amihud) 
 - - 
0.41*** 
(2.91) - - 
4.40*** 
(5.63) - - 
-2.26 
(-1.57) 
Returns - - -0.011 (-1.55) - - 
-0.071* 
(-1.81) - - 
0.043 
(0.60) 
Return Volatility - - 0.024 (0.91) - - 
0.115 
(0.76) - - 
-0.036 
(-0.13) 
Log Assets - - -0.003 (-1.10) - - 
-0.037*** 
(-2.47) - - 
0.003 
(0.09) 
Market-to-Book - - 0.000 (0.04) - - 
-0.002 
(-0.81) - - 
-0.008 
(-1.52) 
Constant 0.13*** (3.21) 
0.047 
(0.86) 
-0.222*** 
(-3.20) 
0.129 
(1.56) 
0.012 
(0.04) 
0.425 
(1.25) 
-0.036 
(-0.83) 
-0.103 
(-0.18) 
0.401 
(0.64) 
No Obs. 
Adj. R2 
Year Dummies 
Industry Dummies 
790 
0.002 
NO 
NO 
781 
0.061 
YES 
YES 
766 
0.088 
YES 
YES 
792 
0.003 
NO 
NO 
783 
0.033 
YES 
YES 
768 
0.109 
YES 
YES 
791 
0.004 
NO 
NO 
782 
0.033 
YES 
YES 
767 
0.004 
YES 
YES 
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Table 20. Split Size and Firm's Investor Base 
Dependent variable represents the sizes of stock splits. Main control variables are proportions of 
investor trade sizes (small/medium/large) in the total trading volume around the announcement 
days. T statistics are provided in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at levels 1% (***), 5 
%(**) and 10 %(*), respectively.  
Split Factor (Split Size) Large Investors
Medium 
Investors
Small 
Investors
ALL 
 
Large Trades (non-event) 0.422*** (3.19) - - 
0.284** 
(2.02) 
Medium Trades (non-event) - 0.053 (0.39)  - 
Small Trades (non-event) - - -0.734*** (-3.77) 
-0.589*** 
(-2.84) 
Illiquidity (Amihud) 
 
-0.175 
(-0.24) 
-0.820 
(-1.11) 
-0.554 
(-0.77) 
-0.20 
(-0.27) 
Returns 0.071** (1.98)
0.081** 
(2.25)
0.063* 
(1.76)
0.060* 
(1.68) 
Return Volatility -0.247* (-1.79) 
-0.255* 
(-1.84) 
-0.231* 
(-1.68) 
-0.231* 
(-1.68) 
Log Assets 0.024 (1.63) 
0.042*** 
(2.90) 
0.028** 
(2.04) 
0.020 
(1.35) 
Market-to-Book 0.008*** (3.07)
0.009*** 
(3.38)
0.008*** 
(3.21)
0.008*** 
(3.04) 
Constant 0.528* (1.70) 
0.458 
(1.42) 
0.839*** 
(2.61) 
0.795** 
(2.47) 
No Obs. 
Adj. R2 
Year Dummies 
Industry Dummies 
768 
0.08 
YES 
YES 
768 
0.06 
YES 
YES 
768 
0.08 
YES 
YES 
768 
0.08 
YES 
YES 
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Table 21. Test of Mean Differences in Matched Pairs 
The table reports mean values of several variables for firms announcing stock splits in a 
given year, and compare them to the mean values of the matched non-announcing firms in 
the same year. Stars indicate significance at levels 1% (***), 5 %(**) and 10%(*), 
respectively. 
   
N 
Split announcing firms Matching firms   
Mean Mean t-Stat 
Small - NABs (3) 421 0.016 -0.015 2.92*** 
Medium -NABs (3) 421 0.123 0.036 2.65*** 
Large - NABs(3) 421 0.001 0.000 0.012 
Small Trades 421 0.079 0.141 -8.82*** 
Medium Trades 421 0.318 0.322 -0.33
Large Trades 421 0.566 0.484 7.06*** 
Illiquidity (Amihud, *mln) 413 0.010 0.028 -2.86*** 
CARs Around Splits (3) 411 0.016 0.003 3.85*** 
Total Assets 421 7156 6671 2.12** 
Returns 414 1.107 0.569 11.52*** 
Volatility of Returns 414 0.536 0.542 0.72 
Market-to-Book 411 5.91 3.55 7.39*** 
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Table 22. Mean Differences in Daily NABs Across Matched Pairs 
The table reports mean values of daily net abnormal buys for firms announcing stock 
splits and compare them to the mean values of the matched non-announcing firms on the 
same days. Stars indicate significance at levels 1% (***), 5 %(**) and 10 %(*), 
respectively. 
 
  
Splitting Firms Matching Firms t-stats 
Small-NAB(-1) -0.002 -0.004 0.70 
Small-NAB(0) 0.011 -0.001 2.39** 
Small-NAB(1) 0.009 -0.010 2.82*** 
Medium-NAB(-1) 0.014 0.005 0.73 
Medium-NAB(0) 0.073 0.002 4.52*** 
Medium-NAB(1) 0.036 0.029 0.38 
Large-NAB(-1) -0.011 0.018 -0.85 
Large-NAB(0) 0.013 -0.012 0.65 
Large-NAB(1) -0.001 -0.006 0.15 
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Table 23. NABs of Different Investors to Split Announcements 
Dependent variable represents Net Abnormal Buys around stock split announcements for each 
investor category in three different columns. Important feature of this test is that the sample 
represents one to one matched splitting and matching firms. Main control variable is the dummy 
variable standing for splitting firms. T statistics are provided in parentheses. Stars indicate 
significance at levels 1% (***), 5 %(**) and 10 %(*), respectively.  
 
Variables Small Investors Medium Investors Large Investors 
Splitting 0.019*** (2.72) 
0.019*** 
(2.83) 
0.019** 
(2.43) 
0.087*** 
(2.63) 
0.087*** 
(2.62) 
0.078** 
(2.09) 
-0.026 
(-0.38) 
-0.026 
(-0.38) 
-0.027 
(-0.35) 
Illiquidity (Amihud) 
 - - 
0.100 
(1.11) - - 
-0.206 
(-1.05) - - 
0.814** 
(2.03) 
Returns - - 0.002 (0.31) - - 
0.018 
(0.63) - - 
0.000 
(0.00) 
Return Volatility - - -0.027 (-1.14) - - 
-0.026 
(-0.23) - - 
0.187 
(0.81) 
Log Assets - - -0.003 (-1.03) - - 
-0.038*** 
(-2.54) - - 
0.032 
(1.04) 
Market-to-Book - - 0.000 (0.09) - - 
-0.002 
(-0.57) - - 
0.000 
(0.06)
Constant -0.006 (-1.07) 
-0.173*** 
(-3.27) 
-0.098 
(-1.49) 
0.036 
(1.51) 
-0.100 
(-0.39) 
0.148 
(0.52) 
0.027 
(0.56) 
0.144 
(0.27) 
-0.177 
(-0.30) 
No Obs. 
Adj. R2 
Year Dummies 
Industry Dummies 
837 
0.008 
NO 
NO 
837 
0.070 
YES 
YES 
821 
0.068 
YES 
YES 
842 
0.008 
NO 
NO 
842 
0.004 
YES 
YES 
826 
0.007 
YES 
YES 
841 
-0.001 
NO 
NO 
841 
-0.001 
YES 
YES 
825 
0.015 
YES 
YES 
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Table 24. Probability of Splits and Firm Investor Base 
Dependent variable represents a dummy variable, for which 1 signifies that the firm has 
announced a stock split. Main control variables are proportions of investor trade sizes 
(small/medium/large) in the total trading volume two weeks before the announcement 
days. T statistics are provided in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at levels 1% 
(***), 5 %(**) and 10 %(*), respectively. 
Probability of Stock Splits Small  Investors 
Medium  
Investors 
Large  
Investors ALL  
Small Trades (non-event) -3.318*** (-3.75) - - 
-2.693*** 
(-2.82) 
Medium Trades (non-event) - 0.630 (1.04) - - 
Large Trades (non-event) - - 1.874*** (3.13) 
1.082 
(1.62) 
Illiquidity (Amihud) 
 
-0.000*** 
(-2.83) 
0.000 
(-3.19) 
-9.242*** 
(-2.56) 
-9.386*** 
(-2.57) 
Returns 1.550*** (8.49) 
1.684*** 
(9.37) 
1.624*** 
(8.88) 
1.540*** 
(8.39) 
Return Volatility -4.056*** (-6.51) 
-4.208*** 
(-6.85) 
-4.086*** 
(-6.54) 
-4.027*** 
(-6.42) 
Log Assets -0.264*** (-3.26) 
-0.179** 
(-2.26) 
-0.269*** 
(-3.27) 
-0.297*** 
(-3.53) 
Market-to-Book 0.115*** (4.33) 
0.124*** 
(4.59) 
0.107*** 
(4.00) 
0.108*** 
(4.06) 
Constant 3.559** (2.36) 
1.377 
(0.98) 
1.899 
(1.4) 
3.321** 
(2.23) 
Year Dummies 
Industry Dummies 
No Obs 
Pseudo R^2. 
YES 
YES 
826 
0.20 
YES 
YES 
826 
0.19 
YES 
YES 
826 
0.19 
YES 
YES 
826 
0.20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
